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Preface  
 
A postgraduate seminar series with a title Critical Infrastructure Protection 
against Cyber Threats held at the Department of Military Technology of the 
National Defence University in the fall of 2013 and 2014. This book is a 
collection of some of talks that were presented in the seminar. The papers 
address origin of critical infrastructure protection, wargaming cyberwar in 
critical infrastructure defence, cyber-target categorization, supervisory control 
and data acquisition systems vulnerabilities, electric power as critical 
infrastructure, improving situational awareness of critical infrastructure and trust 
based situation awareness in high security cloud environment. This set of papers 
tries to give some insight to current issues of the network-centric critical 
infrastructure protection. 
 
The seminar has always made a publication of the papers but this has been an 
internal publication of the Finnish Defence Forces and has not hindered 
publication of the papers in international conferences. Publication of these papers 
in peer reviewed conferences has indeed been always the goal of the seminar, 
since it teaches writing conference level papers. We still hope that an internal 
publication in the department series is useful to the Finnish Defence Forces by 
offering an easy access to these papers. 
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Origin of Critical infrastructure Protection 
- 
Analyse of Ted G Lewis 
 
Sakari Ahvenainen 
Finnish National Defence University 
sakari.ahvenainen@kolumbus.fi 
 
 
Abstract  
Purpose 
 
This article is a report for Finnish Defence University course “Critical 
Infrastructure protection 2013” for post graduate students. This article analyses 
the chapter “Origin” of the course book by professor Ted G Lewis “Critical 
Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked Nation” 
[1] in order to find some new insight to the origin of critical infrastructure 
protection (CIP) and to find some new ideas for Finnish CIP activity. 
 
The objective of this article is to answer the following question:  
 
What is the origin of critical infrastructure protection based on (1) 
professor Ted G Lewis’s course book, (2) formal concept analysis and (3) 
evolution? 
 
Methodology 
 
The process used in this article is evolutionary induction introduced by Karl 
Popper, Austrian-British professor and philosopher of science. It condenses to a 
process of (1) a starting point, an interesting problem, (2) its first interpretations, 
tentative theories, (3) processing information (critical thinking and sorting out of 
mistakes) and finally (4) output, new interpretation of the starting point and birth 
of new problems. [2, p. 287] 
 
Findings 
 
It is found in the article that science of critical infrastructure protection is a very 
new phenomenon but that critical infrastructure protection is as old as critical 
2 
infrastructure itself. The first critical infrastructure for humans was the territory. 
Its protection was the origin of infrastructure protection, not National 
Communications System (NCS) in 1963. For Homo sapiens, modern man, this 
means at least some 100,000 years. And basically territory is the critical 
infrastructure for all animals and plants. It is also found in the article that the 
critical infrastructure protection and its science have more than ten evolutionary 
phases.  
 
Originality/value 
 
Even though “critical infrastructure protection” as a word is quite new, the 
phenomenon of “critical infrastructure protection” is old. The origin of critical 
infrastructure protection is farther away in history and has more steps in this 
article than presented by Lewis. This is according to evolution, the idea that all 
things have history, the only possible exception being Big Bang as a part of our 
universe. 
 
Paper type 
 
Research paper 
 
Keywords  
CIP, evolution, evolutive induction, infrastructure, formal concept analysis  
 
1 Introduction 
 
The process used in this article is evolutionary induction introduced by Karl 
Popper, Austrian-British professor and philosopher of science. It condenses to a 
process of (1) a starting point, interesting problem, (2) its first interpretation, 
tentative theories, (3) processing information (critical thinking and sorting out of 
mistakes) and finally (4) output, new interpretation of the starting point and birth 
of new problems. [2, p. 287] 
 
Popper’s evolutive induction is itself a tentative theory to a problem: How to 
make science? Popper’s evolutive induction is also much like a cybernetic 
process: sensor (input, tentative theories), decision making unit (information 
processing; critical thinking and sorting out of mistakes) and action (output; new 
interpretation of the starting point and birth of new problems) [3, p. 155]. 
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The objective of this article is to answer the following question:  
 
What is the origin of critical infrastructure protection based on (1) 
professor Ted G Lewis’s course book, (2) formal concept analysis and (3) 
evolution? 
 
In chapter 2 (“Origin”) Professor Ted R Lewis briefly reviews the history of 
scientific infrastructure protection from 1962 to 2003. He maintains that his book 
is the first scientific presentation of critical infrastructure protection.  
 
Based on my previous articles I believe that taking some new theories or views 
as tools to analyze the target, I will find new insight to the problem. Here the 
target of analyse is the origin of critical infrastructure protection. Lewis has not 
used widely the formal concept analysis or the notion of evolution in his book. 
 
2 Abstract and comments of the subchapter “Origin” 
 
I will present in this chapter the abstract of the chapter “Origin” (p. 29 – 48) of 
professor Ted R Lewis’s book “Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland 
Security: Defending a Networked Nation” [1]. Lewis’s own view is here 
introduced as a starting point and to analyze the origin of critical infrastructure 
protection. Because of the lenght of this article, all view points are quite basic. 
Subchapters in this chapter are named accoding to Lewis’s book. 
 
Lewis: The dawn of critical infrastructure protection 
 
The CIP began with the creation of the (NCS) in 1963 after communication 
problems between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cuban 
missile crises in 1962. [1, p. 30] 
 
The objective of NCS was “to provide necessary communications for the Federal 
Government under all conditions ranging from a normal situation to national 
emergencies and international crises, including nuclear attack”. It was the first 
US act on governmental communication organization and there were many more 
to came [1, pp. 30 - 31] 
 
The importance of communication continued in CIP because National Security 
Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), established 1982, was 
perhaps the first organization to advise the president on critical infrastructure 
protection [1, p. 31]. 
 
It would take some twenty years before CIP would form as a notion after these 
“communication acts” [1, p. 31]. 
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As the author of this article I have the following comments to the above 
mentioned quotations: 
 
1. CIP started in USA 1963 with securing communication. This is not a 
surprise, because communication is the glue that binds parts of system 
together [4, pp. 156 and 160 - 1] to make synergy. Communication is not 
just a part of system; it is the part that builds up a system. 
2. Communication was two decades the only CIP domain in CIP. Why? Was 
it because the need for CIP had not risen as USA felt to be safe in its 
continent, as Lewis also noticed.  
 
Lewis: Dawn of terrorism in the United States 
 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created in 1978 to 
fight hurricanes and earthquakes and soon also terrorism [1, p. 31]. FEMA is a 
powerful and large emergency organization in USA. It has some 7000 workers. 
 
FEMA’s first act on terrorism was in 1984, when “Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh” 
cult poisoned salad bars in 10 restaurants in The Dalles, sickening 751 people 
with salmonella bacteria, forty-five of whom were hospitalized. It is still the 
largest germ warfare attack in U.S. history. [1, p. 32] 
 
The importance of infrastructure was beginning to dawn on the federal 
government when in 1988 President Reagan issued Executive Order 12656 
(about assignment of emergency preparedness responsibilities) [1, p. 32]. 
 
Terrorism was rising in 1990’s. The 1993 attack on the World Trade Centre by 
Ramzi Yousef, the capture of the Unabomber (1995), the devastating attack on 
the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (1995), and the Sarin gas 
attack in a Tokyo subway in 1995 suggested a trend. Within five to six years, this 
would become known as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). [1, p. 33] 
 
As the author of this article I have following comments to the above mentioned 
quotations: 
 
1. FEMA and its work on fighting hurricanes and earthquakes and soon also 
terrorism was the second domain of CIP in USA after realising the 
importance of communication systems 
2. The Dalles salmonella case with over 700 sick people is maybe not very 
widely known in Finland, although it is still the largest germ warfare 
attack in U.S. history. 
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Lewis: What is a critical infrastructure? 
 
The modern origin of homeland security, and its corollary, CIP, can be placed 
somewhere between 1993 and late 1995 [1, p. 33]. 
 
Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) issued by President Clinton in 1995 set the stage 
for what was to come a new Federal Department of Homeland Security. PDD-39 
essentially declared war on terrorists [1, p. 33]. 
 
The criticality of national infrastructure and corresponding assets became an 
important issue when President Clinton issued Executive Order EO-13010 in 
1996. It established a Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (PCCIP). Its first chairman was Robert March, hence "Marsh Report” 
[1, p. 34]. 
 
"Marsh Report" defines "critical infrastructure" in terms of "energy, banking and 
finance, transportation, vital human services, and telecommunications." It was 
the first publication to use the term "critical infrastructure" and has become one 
of the foundational documents of CIP history [1, p. 34]. 
 
The "Marsh Report" and Executive Order EO-13010 provided the first definition 
of infrastructure and loosely described an infrastructure as "a network of 
independent, mostly privately-owned, man-made systems that function 
collaboratively and synergistically to produce and distribute a continuous flow of 
essential goods and services." And a Cl as "an infrastructure so vital that its 
incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on our defence and 
national security." [1, p. 34] 
 
Threats to these critical infrastructures fall into two categories: physical threats to 
tangible property, and threats of electronic, radio frequency, or computer-based 
attacks on the information or communications components that control critical 
infrastructures ("cyber threats") [1, p. 34]. 
 
Because many of these critical infrastructures are owned and operated by the 
private sector, it is essential that the government and private sector work together 
to develop a strategy for protecting them and assuring their continued operation 
[1, p. 34]. 
 
Definition of critical infrastructure in PDD-63 went through rapid evolution and 
expansion after the attacks of 9/11 [1, p. 35]. 
 
Control of most public utility infrastructure was in the hands of corporations. 
Thus, in 1999, President Clinton established National Infrastructure Assurance 
Council (NIAC) to bring industry and government closer together [1, p. 36]. 
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As the author of this article I have the following comments to the above 
mentioned quotations: 
 
1. The third phase of CIP in USA after securing communication and 
establishing FEMA was homeland security, and its corollary, CIP, 
between 1993 and late 1995 
2. The first publication to use the term "critical infrastructure" was the 
March report in 1996. It also had the first definition of infrastructure. 
3. Infrastructure was defined as man-made. This excludes for example 
territory and rivers, which I consider infrastructures based on formal 
concept analysis made in this article. 
4. There are old physical threats and new cyber threats in CIP. This is 
according to one effect of evolution: Nothing old disappears; they are just 
a part of the new. 
5. CIP is owned mostly by private sector; hence Public-Private-Partnership 
(P3) is vital. This is interesting for Finland because we have a 60 years 
history of P3P meaning the predecessor of NESA (National Emergency 
Supply Agency), the PTS (PuolustusTaloudellinen Suunnittelukunta; 
Defence-Economical Planning Committee)1.  
6. Lewis does not use the obvious choice of formal concept analysis to 
analyse the meaning of origin, or critical or infrastructure or protection. 
 
Lewis: CIP is recognized as being a core component 
 
By Executive Order 13231 (October 2001) President Bush created the President's 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Board (PCIPB), with the primary responsibility 
to protect the information infrastructure of the federal government. Without 
information systems, the U.S. Federal Government could not continue to operate 
in the event of an attack. [1, p. 37] 
 
In 2002 President Bush signed the Homeland Security Bill, establishing the new 
DHS. It began operation in February 2003 and incorporated 22 agencies that had 
been spread throughout the federal bureaucracy. Thus, protection of critical 
infrastructure is now the responsibility of the DHS [1, p. 38]. 
 
In December 2003, President Bush replaced PDD-63 with HSPD-7 (Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive #7), which rewrote the list of sectors and who is 
responsible [1, p. 38] 
 
                                                 
1 PTS was established in 1955 (http://www.huoltovarmuus.fi/organisaatio/huoltovarmuuskeskus/lyhyt-
historia/) 
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It appears that HSPD-7 was written to address in-fighting among departments 
and agencies that may have felt left out of the National Strategy [1, p. 38]. 
 
As the author of this article I have the following comments to the above 
mentioned quotations: 
 
1. This US problem solving principle of putting existing organization 
together is interesting. 
2. When something becomes important and gets new recourses, it will 
become a battlefield in politics. 
 
Lewis: Analysis 
 
CIP has grown to encompass most of the U.S. economy. It is difficult to identify 
sectors that are not critical. Indeed, CIP has come to embrace just about every 
aspect of society, from communications, power, and health care, to the food we 
eat, water we drink, and work we do. If CIP embraces nearly everything, perhaps 
it has lost its focus [1, p. 39]. 
 
The first objective of this Strategy is to identify and assure the protection of those 
assets, systems, and functions that we deem most ”critical” ... [1, p. 39] 
 
Uncertainty remains at the national and local levels of government as to what is 
critical and what is not [1, p. 39]. 
 
President Bush signed HSPD-7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, 
Prioritization, and Protection. At the time of this writing, HSPD-7 was the latest 
declaration by the federal government on CIP [1, p. 39]. 
 
For the first time, HSPD-7 declared that it is impractical to protect everything 
and focused effort on major incidents. [1, p. 39] 
 
CIP has come of age. It is now at the core of homeland security. It has evolved 
over several decades and gone through several phases: (1) Recognition (The 
1962 Cuban Missile Crises) (modern telecommunications technology), (2) 
Natural Disaster Recovery (FEMA starting from 1978), (3) Definitional Phase 
(1997), (4) Public-Private Cooperation (2004) and (5) Federalism (2003). 
[1, pp. 40 - 41] 
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As the author of this article I have the following comments to the above 
mentioned quotations: 
 
1. In the 2000’s the whole complexity of CIP is revealed. Modern 
technological society consists of many intertwined systems and it is 
difficult to say which part of the main system is more important than the 
other. This is also a central conclusion of National Emergency Supply 
Agency’s two year project “SOPIVA”2 (SOPImuksiin perustuva 
VArautuminen, Preparedness Based on Agreements) 2006 – 2007. 
2. Centring ones protection of critical infrastructure is a good idea in 
principle. But it calls for prioritizing, which is not straightforward.  
 
3 Formal concept analysis: Definition of key words 
 
Formal concept analysis is the first tentative theory in this article. Because of the 
lenght of this article, the discussion of this tentative theory is quite basic. 
 
About origin 
 
The chapter of Lewis book under my scrutiny is entitled “Origin”. Origin in the 
meaning we are interested in here3 is connected to ancestry and parentage, for 
example history, passing of time. It means also rise, beginning, or derivation 
from a source. Origin is the point at which something begins or rises or from 
which it derives.4 
 
So the origin of critical infrastructure protection is its ancestry and 
parentage, e.g. history or the rise, beginning, or derivation of it from its 
source. Origin of CIP is the point at which it begins or rises or from 
which it derives. Origin of CIP has “parents”, pre-phases. 
 
                                                 
2 General information about SOPIVA – recommendation (some in English) 
http://www.huoltovarmuus.fi/tietoa-huoltovarmuudesta/jatkuvuudenhallinta/sopiva/ 
Report of the 2nd part of the project (2007) (in Finnish): http://www.huoltovarmuus.fi/static/pdf/225.pdf 
Report of the 1st  part of the project (2006) (in Finnish): http://www.huoltovarmuus.fi/static/pdf/230.pdf   
3 Origin is also the more fixed, central, or larger attachment of a muscle and the intersection of coordinate 
axes (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/origin) 
4 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/origin 
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About critical 
 
Critical in the meaning we are interested in here5 means crucial, decisive and 
indispensable.6 
 
We can live without bicycles or motorcycles, but not without some kind of 
transportation. We can live without bananas or oranges, but not very long 
without some kind of food. This means that, if needed, we can give away lots of 
thing but there is a gray limit that is not crossable. So critical means that in many 
cases there is something not-critical that we can live without, if we choose so. 
 
The type of society is also important. One human of small group of humans can 
live without roads. But modern technological society cannot live without road. 
There is an analogous relationship with computer systems and post modern 
information society. 
 
So critical in critical infrastructure protection means an infrastructure 
without which we cannot live (the life we want) and without which our 
systems will not function.  
 
About infrastructure 
 
Infrastructure in the sense that we are interested in here7 means the underlying 
foundation or basic framework of a system or an organization. Infrastructure as a 
word is very new. It was first used in 1927.8 
 
Infra is Latin and means underneath, below. Structure means permanence of 
pattern, something that has some shape and the shape is permanent. So 
infrastructure is something underneath that has some shape and the shape is 
permanent. Adding to this foundation or basic framework we get: 
 
Infrastructure is something underneath that has some shape and the shape 
is permanent and this infrastructure is a foundation to many things. 
 
                                                 
5 Critical is also relating to or being the stage of a disease at which an abrupt change for better or worse 
may be expected and : inclined to criticize severely and unfavorably or exercising or involving careful 
judgment or judicious evaluation (critical thinking) or including variant readings and scholarly 
emendations (a critical edition) or of sufficient size to sustain a chain reaction (a critical mass) or 
sustaining a nuclear chain reaction (the reactor went critical) (http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/critical) 
6 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/critical 
7 Other uses are the permanent installations required for military purposes and the system of public works 
of a country, state, or region; also : the resources (as personnel, buildings, or equipment) required for an 
activity (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/infrastructure) 
8 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/infrastructure 
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According to this definition, what are infrastructures? Energy, banking and 
finance, transportation, vital human services, and telecommunications. Yes. Even 
critical.  But there is no hint in this analyze to the word “man-made”. I will 
continue with this idea in the chapter “Evolution”. 
 
Take for example transportation. It is not a 21st century invention. Rivers as 
transport system were very critical infrastructure for the first civilizations some 
5000 years ago. These civilizations were river-based, for example in Egypt, 
China and India [5, p. 58 and 63]. 
 
It is also clear that communication per se is an infrastructure, a permanent shape 
that is foundation to many things. This means that language [6], writing [7] and 
printing9 [8] are infrastructures. 
About protection 
Protection in the meaning that we are interested in here10 means the act of 
protecting, the state of being protected, one that protects or supervision or 
support of one that is smaller and weaker.11 
 
So the protection in critical infrastructure protection means the act of 
protection or the state of being protected. 
 
Protected against what? Against an attack, extreme weather condition, misuse, 
bad design, its own complexity, foreign influence (language). In military this is 
called defense. 
 
About origin of critical infrastructure protection 
 
According to the short formal concept analysis made in this article, the origin of 
critical infrastructure protection was: 
 
the birth of protection of something underneath that has some shape and 
the shape is permanent and this something is a foundation to many things 
and without which we cannot live (the life we want to live) and without 
which our systems will not function. 
 
                                                 
9 Professor Bosse Sundin calls printing ”The Greatest Invention of All Times”. 
(http://koivu.oulu.fi/~histwww/aoh/6.htm) (in Finnish) 
10 Protection  means also a contraceptive device (as a condom) or : the freeing of the producers of a 
country from foreign competition in their home market by restrictions (as high duties) on foreign 
competitive goods or anchoring equipment placed in cracks for safety while rock climbing or immunity 
from prosecution purchased by criminals through bribery or money extorted by racketeers 
posing as a protective association 
 (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/origin) 
11 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/origin 
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One such critical infrastructure was and is one’s territory. At the very beginning 
it was a piece of land under one’s or one’s clan’s foots. It contains everything 
one’s clan needed, for example water sources, games12, trees to collect fruits, 
caves to sleep, plants to use as a drugs and stones to build weapons. It was also 
one of the oldest reasons for war (defense, protection!) already in the prehistory 
of mankind [9, pp. 23, 37] and still is. 
 
So the origin of critical infrastructure protection is quite far away in the history, 
when analyzed this way. It started with the protection of one’s territory. The 
word “infrastructure” itself is just some 80 years old.  
 
4 Evolution 
 
The word “origin” hints quite directly to evolution. Evolution is the second 
tentative theory in this article. Because of the lenght of this article, the discussion 
of this tentative theory is quite basic. 
 
Evolution as a whole 
 
The great idea of evolution is based on the notion of time and change of system 
states. In biology the latter is called variation. All things have history and pre-
phases, maybe excluding Big Bang. All systems also change, maybe excluding 
stable atoms and their parts (proton) [10, pp. 332 - 4]. 
 
This is well presented in professor Eero Paloheimo’s book “Megaevoluutio” 
(Megaevolution), which starts from Big Bang and processes through time having 
following states or systems that build up each other: quarks (and electron), 
subatomic particles, light atoms, stars and supernovas, heavy atoms, living cell 
(life), multicellular organs, man and his organization and technology [11]. 
 
Evolution of man  
 
Man has always been living in groups and had societies and this has shaped his 
brains considerably [12, p. 29 and 34]. In the long history of mankind there have 
been the following organizations and phases: clan (animal, before 50,000 BC), 
tribe (primitive, after 50,000 BC), state (historical, after 3000 BC), culture13  
(modern, after 1500 AD) and global mankind (postmodern, 2000 AD) [5], [9, pp. 
29 - 33 and 37], [13]. 
 
                                                 
12 Ref. Killing of the buffalos in USA in the 1870’s to fight the plain Indians 
13 Cultures of technology and science meaning Western, Arabic, Chinese, … 
12 
All great communication revolutions in the evolution of mankind have also been 
revolutions in the infrastructure, because information is a very basic necessity to 
many, if not all human activities. These communication revolutions have been 
birth of language, invention of writing, printing and global computer technology 
[14]. 
 
The birth of modern language some 50,000 years ago was a great leap forward in 
the human evolution. With modern language came new rapidly advancing stone 
technology, art and first commerce [6, pp. 58 - 60]. The last can be seen as a new 
kind of infrastructure that made precious items like stone weapons, ideas and 
luxury items to flow. 
 
First great civilizations emerge from great rivers [15, p. 74], because rivers are 
not just water sources for drinking and fishing, but also irrigation systems for 
agriculture and very efficient transport system, therefore infrastructures. 
Evolution of technology 
Also technology has advanced in phases that are building up each other. These 
have been tools, machines, systems and systems of systems [16]. Internet is a 
fine example of the last ones. 
 
Before aircraft, ballistic missiles and internet there was no other way to attack 
critical infrastructure of the enemy (state) than to move an army to the target 
area. In the era of precision guided weapons, especially cheap JDAM-type 
weapons and Stuxnet-type more expensive weapons, hitting hubs of critical 
infrastructure became easy. 
 
For economic reasons, increasing deregulation and competition create an 
increased reliance on information systems to operate, maintain, and monitor 
critical infrastructures. This in turn creates a tunnel of vulnerability previously 
unrealized in the history of conflict. [17, p. 796] 
 
This is why cyber is so important in our time and even more important in the 
future. It means also that cyber meaning computer based information systems is a 
new kind of critical infrastructure of information. 
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Conclusions from evolution 
 
The origin of critical infrastructure protection is quite far away in the evolution, 
as analyzed in this article. 
 
Now we have an evolutionary timeline of scientific critical infrastructure 
protection: 
 
1. critical basic infrastructure (territory, always with life) 
2. the birth of modern language (some 50,000 years ago) 
3. commerce as a new networking application and an infrastructure (some 
50,000 years ago) 
4. the invention of writing (some 5000 years ago) 
5. first applied critical infrastructure (rivers, some 5000 years ago) and then 
others like basic roads, harbors, cities, … 
6. the invention printing (500 years ago) 
7. critical scientific-technological infrastructure (steam, petrol, electrical 
power; roads, railroads, harbors, airports, …) (some 150 years ago) 
8. critical scientific-electronic information infrastructure (telegraph and 
telephone systems and computers (some 150 years ago) 
9. the introduction of the word “infrastructure” (1927) 
10. the introduction of the term “critical infrastructure protection” (1997) [1, 
p. 2] 
11. the birth of global computer infrastructure, for example internet (some 20 
years ago) 
12. science of critical infrastructure protection (Lewis [1, p. vii]) (about 10 
years ago) 
 
5 Information processing 
 
As mentioned earlier, Lewis does not use the obvious choice of formal concept 
analysis to analyse the meaning of origin, critical, infrastructure or protection. 
The use of formal concept analysis was found out to be productive in this article. 
It widened the history of origin of critical infrastructure protection. This wider 
interpretation considers territory and rivers as infrastructures. 
 
The great idea of evolution is the notion of time, history or pre-state for a latter 
state. For CIP this means that it had some pre-phase or birth, before becoming 
CIP. 
 
Starting points, the tentative theories, should according to Popper, give rise to the 
deepest and most unexpected problems and of course solve the problem well [2, 
pp. 287 - 8]. It is interesting that Popper does not produce any list of such 
theories. One view of what these theories could be is presented for example in 
14 
Peter Atkin’s book “Galileo’s Finger – The Great Ideas of Science”. These 
“ideas” are evolution, DNA, energy, entropy, atoms, symmetry, quanta, 
cosmology, spacetime and arithmetic [4]. Finnish physicist and professor Kari 
Enqvist lists three great ideas of physical science: energy, entropy and emergence 
[19, p. 7].  
 
I have used General Systems Theory [20] in recent years [3], [14] as a “great 
idea”. It is very much connected in the above lists to evolution, DNA and 
emergence. I would personally list General Systems Theory and its applications 
e.g. cybernetics to the list of great ideas.  
 
6 Conclusion 
Conclusions about the chapter “Origin” 
 
The research question of this article was to answer the following question: What 
is the origin of critical infrastructure protection based on (1) professor Ted G 
Lewis’s course book, (2) formal concept analysis and (3) evolution? 
 
The answers are: (1) According to professor Ted G Lewis, the origin of critical 
infrastructure protection (in USA) was the creation of the National 
Communications System (NCS) in 1963 after communication problems between 
the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crises in 1962. 
[1, p. 40] 
 
(2) According to the formal concept analysis made in this article, the origin of 
critical infrastructure protection was the birth of protection of something 
underneath that has some shape and the shape is permanent and this something is 
a foundation to many things and without which we cannot live and without which 
our systems will not function. First this kind of infrastructure found in the article 
was territory. 
 
 (3) According to evolution, the origin of critical infrastructure protection has a 
long history and over ten principal phases from physical infrastructures to social 
infrastructures to technological infrastructures and lastly to information 
technological infrastructures (cyber). Revolutions in the communication 
technology of mankind have also been always revolutions in the critical 
infrastructure of mankind. 
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Conclusions for the Finnish CIP 
 
The origin of CIP (in USA) was the communication needs for US Government in 
time of global crises [1, p. 30]. This is interesting for Finnish emergency work or 
emergency work in general: the first item needed in times of crises is 
communication capacity.14 
 
Prioritizing is a problem in Finland as a part of CIP15. It is interesting that it grow 
up as a problem also in the birth of US CIP history. The importance of 
prioritizing can be noticed from the fact that later on it was as a word in the title 
in one of the presidential orders in USA. 
 
The other interesting point regarding the president of USA is his many advice 
organs. Is this an application to use also in Finland? 
 
Public-Private-Partnership also grow up to an item in 1990’s in the USA CIP 
history. In Finland we have used this idea in CIP protection for at least 60 years. 
 
7 Discussion 
 
More information processing on this subject, meaning critical thinking and error 
elimination is needed, like always, to have better science.  It is still presented in 
the article, that extra theories, even if presented shortly, give always extra 
insight. This confirms Popper’s idea of evolutionary induction. 
 
As a very new theory of CIP, Lewis’s book is not widely used and widely tested 
theory, although used and tested as presented within the book. Still I did not find 
anything to correct, but that is not a big statement, because the chapter under my 
scrutiny was not the heart of Lewis’s theory.  
 
In this article formal concept analysis did give a more theoretical notion of CIP, 
not just list of things that are in the public or in documents of US Government 
nowadays considered to be part of CIP. The integrated concept presented in this 
article can be used to determine what CIP is and what is not. This is not done in 
this version of the article. 
 
The idea of evolution proved to be effective, ones again. Now we have in this 
article a bit longer history of CIP and its pre-phases. 
 
                                                 
14 Ref. In Finland government’s Tetra based Virve mobile network from 1990’s and the new 2010’s 
government’s TUVE – security communication network. 
15 There have been seven regional exercises in Finland 2008 – 2012 that were focused on co-operation of 
telecommunication, power supply and contractor firms.  One of six major problems found in the series of 
these exercises was the priorization in case of bigger emergencies. 
16 
As modern experimental and mathematical science was born in the Renaissance, 
it is probable that critical infrastructure protection has its scientific “parentage” in 
that period. 
 
It is presented in the article that commerce was a new networking application and 
an infrastructure introduced some 50,000 years ago. This is at least the time to go 
back if we want to be really independent and in no contact with other far away 
people. 
 
It was noticed in the process of writing this article, that Popper’s evolutive 
induction, used as a basic analyzing tool in this article, is actually a cybernetic, 
information processing process. This confirms both cybernetics [21] and 
Popper’s evolutive induction according to best practises of Popper’s evolutive 
induction! 
 
8 New problems 
 
The use of Popper’s evolutive induction requires that one has deep theories as a 
starting point. It is interesting that Popper does not provide such a list in his 
book. Some starting points are discussed in the article for these theories. 
 
The phases that Lewis presents as the history of CIP were importance of 
communication systems, protection for natural disasters, birth of homeland 
security and the notion of CIP, definition of CIP, Public-Private-Partnership, 
prioritization, and federalism. Is there something evolutionary in these phases? 
 
Prioritization in CIP and emergency situations is a major problem. Lewis solves 
this for CIP in his book by the network analyze, but is it also a solution for 
emergency situations? 
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Abstract  
Purpose and approach 
 
The role of critical infrastructure protection in the information society has 
increased steadily. Critical infrastructure systems have increased their 
dependence on information systems and communication networks. Critical 
infrastructure systems are built on a complex and interdependent networks and 
nation security and defence are based on society critical infrastructure. Cyberwar 
against nations critical infrastructure currently represents a major threat to 
national security. 
 
The national security authorities make plans and prepare to fight against 
cyberwar attacks. A great challenge is to make defence plans and preparations in 
this complex field of cyberwar threats. And the challenge is even greater because 
the responsibilities and the mandates are split between various authorities. 
Wargaming can be used as a tool to gain insight, experiences, and to find in 
advance potential problems of cyberwar element in critical infrastructure 
defence. The purpose of this article is to analyse cyberwar capabilities from a 
wargaming point of view, focusing on network-centric critical infrastructure 
defence. The aim is to find out how cyberwar elements can be used in wargaming 
of critical infrastructure defence. 
 
Cyberwar is approached in this article from the perspective of wargaming and 
analysing of cyberwar impact on the ways of assimilating them to the traditional 
means of influencing in wargaming. The article is based on literature study. 
 
Findings and orginality 
 
Cyberwar components can be a part of impact categories of wargaming, but it 
should be taken into account already in the design of the wargame. The cyberwar 
components in wargames that are dealing with the critical infrastructure in 
network-centric defence can be used to create estimates on the impact of the 
cyberwar components in critical infrastructure defence. 
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The article content consists of well-known cyberwar capabilities that are 
examined from wargaming perspective. The article outlines cyberwar capabilities 
from a perspective not so common. The article can be used as a basis for a more 
detailed examination on the effects that cyberwar brings to the traditional 
wargaming.  
 
Keywords  
Wargame, Wargaming, Cyberwar, Cyber Defence, Critical Infrastructure 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The protection of national critical infrastructures has gained a central role in 
western emergency planning because new asymmetric security threats have 
evolved to information based societies. Information technology has brought new 
ways to manage critical infrastructures but has also created new ways to affect 
warfare and terrorism. The benefits of information technology are vast and 
nowadays there are not many critical infrastructure services that could cope 
without information systems and communication networks. The different parts of 
national critical infrastructures are interdependent and create complicated chains 
of dependence. [1; 2; 3] 
 
An infrastructure is considered critical when it is vital to national security. A 
critical infrastructure is that part of nations infrastructure that it’s incapacity or 
destruction would have a debilitating impact on a nation defence and national 
security. Critical infrastructure defence is to protect, prevent, and respond to 
attacks on critical infrastructure. [1] 
 
Cyber defence means actions combining information assurance, computer 
network defence (including response actions), and critical infrastructure 
protection with enabling capabilities to prevent, detect, and ultimately respond to 
an adversary’s ability to deny or manipulate information and/or infrastructure [4]. 
Cyberwar attacks are becoming more frequent and more organized. The damage 
they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and 
potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical 
infrastructure are more costly. They can reach a threshold that threatens national 
security and stability. Foreign militaries and intelligence services, organized 
criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be a source of such attacks. 
[5] 
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A great challenge is make defence plans and preparations in these very complex 
systems to prevent cyberwar attacks. And the challenge is even greater because 
the responsibilities and the mandates are split between various authorities. 
Wargaming can be used as a tool to gain insight, experiences, and to find 
potential problems in advance of cyberwar element in critical infrastructure 
defence. 
 
Geographically dispersed forces maintaining a high level of situational awareness 
characterize network-centric warfare, allowing increased combat effectiveness 
[6]. Network-centric warfare is a military doctrine that seeks to translate an 
information advantage, enabled in part by information technology; into a 
competitive warfighting advantage through the robust networking of well 
informed geographically dispersed forces [7]. Network-centric warfare, cyber 
defence and critical infrastructure together form a very hard-modelled 
environment, which is very challenging to perceive a whole. 
 
Wargaming can be used to many purposes, for training, education, research and 
analysis, and discovery. Wargaming can be used to discover some previously 
unknown problems from highly complex situation, like critical infrastructure 
defence in network-centric warfare. Other discovery methods, like modelling and 
simulation or operations research, with the same resources (money, time, etc) are 
not adequate. In critical infrastructure defence in network-centric warfare 
wargaming is used to find problems in defence plans, preparations, and 
mandates. Wargaming can also be used to training purposes. [8; 9] 
 
2 Research work 
2.1 Critical infrastructure defence 
 
Critical infrastructure networks are key targets for cyberwar. Networks have 
grown to the point where they run the command and control systems, manage to 
logistics, enable the staff planning and operations, and are the backbone of the 
intelligence capabilities. [10] 
 
Critical infrastructure defence’s definition in Finland is: “The overall objective is 
the safety of the population and the basic functions of the sufficient supply to 
maintain. Security of supply is dimensioned so that the livelihood of the 
population, society functions necessary for the defence and material conditions 
are not compromised.” [11; 12] 
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Critical infrastructure in Finland is [11]: 
 
1) Society technical infrastructure, which includes energy networks, 
telecommunication networks, the key information systems, mass 
communications, financial services, payment transactions, and cash 
management, information technology maintenance, water supply, and 
the other main civil engineering basic services. 
2) Transport, storage, and distribution systems, which include maritime 
transport, basic food and energy transportations, ice-strengthened 
vessels, air transportation, and the main logistic chains. 
3) Food supply, which includes intended for human consumption of 
cereals, protein, seed grain, and clean water. 
4) Security of energy supply, which includes heat and power production, 
fuels, distribution and transmission networks, and imported fuels. 
5) Health and social care, which includes pharmaceutical, medical and 
vaccine maintenance, equipment, and its maintenance and spare parts. 
6) National defence supporting production and system maintenance, 
which includes defence equipment industry, technically sophisticated 
weapons system maintenance and repair, ammunition maintenance, 
building capacity, research and development, and international 
compatibility. 
 
All infrastructure, production and management are dependent on information 
systems and communication networks, which form a complex network. It is 
possible that the problems can switch from one system to another, and can cause 
cumulative risks. The complexity of systems lays high demands to the operative 
staff. 
 
To defence critical infrastructure it must be determined which functions are 
essential to the nation, and which infrastructure systems are essential to the 
functioning of these. Then there must be identified the critical parts and 
components of various infrastructure systems that are critical to the functioning 
of the systems individually and with each other. It must be examined the critical 
points and components relationships with each other, and on this basis the critical 
points are sorted to an order of importance. There may be the problem that there 
are so many critical points. When the infrastructure develops, the critical points 
are increasing and changing so rapidly, that it is not possible to make complete 
list. On the other hand interdependencies are impossible to determine without 
knowing the critical points. [2] 
 
In the defence of critical infrastructure individuals and their professionalism 
plays an important role, concerning both the leaders and the experts. Individual’s 
know-how development and emergency planning and preparation form a bases to 
critical infrastructure defence. 
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Surveillance plays important role of critical infrastructure defence. If is possible 
to monitoring on the various means of communications moving area of interest, it 
can give a warning when coordinated activities, such as attacks may be taking 
place in the immediate future. When designing the wargame, there need to think 
every operator and/or system capability to reconnoitre and to surveillance.  
 
2.2 Military wargaming 
 
"The general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple before the 
battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations 
beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to 
defeat; how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I 
can foresee who is likely to win or lose.” 
Sun Tzu, ”The Art of War” 
 
Wargame is a simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving 
two or more opposing forces using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict 
an actual or assumed real life situation. [13; 14; 15] Military wargaming in 
Finland is understood as a part of a military exercise, a part of the planning 
process, or as training for military simulators and games [16]. Wargaming can 
also be used as a tool to analyze own operational possibilities [17]. A wargame is 
a warfare model or simulation in which the flow of events is shaped by decisions 
made by human players representing the opposing sides, during the course of 
those events. [8] 
 
Typically in wargames there are used a game board or map, where the counters 
are placed and moved as the game progresses. The counters are describe units or 
others entities whose activities are played. Typically wargame is executed in 
steps. The execution of wargame starts with an introduction to a situation. Then 
every step is carried out in sequences consisting of cycles with the move of 
action, reaction, and counteraction. The execution is a strict, disciplined process 
with explicitly defined functions and rules for usage. When all steps have been 
run through, the execution of wargame is over. [17] 
 
In a military exercise wargaming is used to create events and to plays the troops, 
which are not on the battlefield [16]. Full-scale war exercises in large scale, that 
involve all the potential actors, sets, and systems are very expensive. Wargaming 
is also used to create events and resolve battle situations what normally cannot be 
done; for example, the weapons effect simulation on the troops. Cyberwar effects 
are described to the forces same manner that traditional wargaming effects in a 
military exercise wargaming. 
 
As a discovery tool wargame provides a systematic method to analyze many 
varied factors. It forces decisions to be made, and permits the interactions and 
relationships among the factors to appear in concrete form. [18] The discovery 
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wargaming is especially useful when examining a new type of troops and / or 
equipment. In this case, there can be obtained from observations of the things, 
which usually can be observed only in the first field trials. 
 
In the planning process and the training wargaming is a way to simulate battles 
or events according to the rules. The scale of wargaming and modeling accuracy 
varies. By roughly divided there are four different formats of wargaming in 
Finland [16]: 
 
1) the map exercise, 
2) the wargame, 
3) the computer simulation and, 
4) the analytical model. 
 
In a map exercise the simulation accuracy is typically the least accurate. Usually 
the events, the battles and, their consequences will be determined by the debate 
of experts in front of the map. [8; 19; 20] In many cases, map exercises will 
cover the pre-prepared situations in which experts form a coherent opinion. 
 
Figure 1. Military wargaming formats in Finland 
 
The most accurate simulation, the analytical model, aims to analyze the fight 
mathematically [21]. From the wargaming point of view, the analytical model is 
designed to eliminate the human variable from the battle. In playing wargames, 
decisions made by man plays an important role and bring human factor into a 
battle. [8; 22] 
 
The wargame format can be divided in three different categories depending on 
how they use computer technology [8]: 
 
1) the manual wargame, 
2) the computer-aided wargame and, 
3) the computer-based wargame. 
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The manual wargame can be divided in two categories depending on how rules 
are used for determine the outcomes of events and battles: the free wargame and, 
the rule based wargame. In a free wargame the umpire define the battlefield 
events and the consequences of the events and the battles, on the basis of 
experience and professional skills. In the rule-based wargame the rules of the 
game determine the consequences of the events and the battles. [17; 19; 23] 
 
The computer-aided wargames are more sophisticated versions of the manual 
wargames. They use information technology to help game managers or the 
umpire to manage the wargame. The computer assigns to determine the outcomes 
of the events and the battles. That is to allow the use of more complex rules than 
in a manual wargame. In a computer-aided wargame there can also be a partially 
computerized opponent. [8; 17] 
 
The computer-based wargames are playable on the computer. There is the 
battlefield in the computer game and the needed troops and actors are modeled in 
the computer. The wargame software in the computer runs the events and the 
battles and solves the consequences by the programmed rules. The game 
managers do not usually have the opportunity to influence on the consequences 
of the events and the battles of the game, only the wargame players activity 
influences. [8] 
 
The computer simulations are simulating a battlefield as accurately as possible. 
The computer simulation has often opponents modeled in artificial intelligence. 
In most of the cases, the computer simulation is used to simulate individually 
every soldiers or small military forces activities. [21] The most commonly used 
military simulators in Finland are flight simulators and Virtual Battlespace 2 
(VBS2). 
 
The discovery by wargaming starts by setting a research question to determine 
what is being studied. The research question is analysed in order to determine the 
criteria for wargaming. The criteria will determine the place (the battlefield) and 
the time where the wargaming scenario takes place and what kinds of forces are 
used and what is the initial situation. This forms the base of the wargaming 
scenario, which may have a number of options to play. In addition, the analysis 
of the research question determines resolution of the wargaming to the wargame 
model and to player’s necessary instructions to play the wargame. [17; 19; 20] 
 
The players of the wargame are playing one or more wargames to get an insight 
of the research question. By the activities of the players in wargame events, 
accumulates material to be analysed in two ways: subjective observations and 
mathematical analysis. The players and the observers of the wargame make 
subjective observations on the events and the battles in the wargame. The 
wargame model (in the computer-assisted, the computer-based, and the computer 
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simulations) performs calculations and this data can be analysed by using 
mathematical analysis methods. [20; 24] 
 
Situation at the end of the wargame / wargames, as well as the subjective 
findings of the events and the battles and the mathematical analyses can be used 
to make estimates of the effectiveness of different things and to give estimates 
considering the research question. The wargame / wargames are mostly unique 
and are usually not reproducible in the quantities needed for scientific certainty. 
[8; 20; 24] 
 
The findings of the wargaming need to be examined more detailed by analytical 
methods and by simulations of the component parts, as well as by literature 
review to achieve scientifically sound conclusions. The main findings of the 
wargaming seem to be subjective findings of the wargame events and battles. 
[20] 
 
The biggest challenge in design the wargame is to find the right balance of detail 
and smoothness of the game progress. One example is an unprecedentedly 
detailed military simulation game of the North Africa Campaign of World War 
II, The Campaign for North Africa. According to game manufacturer 
(Simulations Publications, Inc) a complete game can run over 1500 hours. The 
rules cover logistic in extreme detail. [25] 
 
2.3 Cyberwar and cyber defence in wargaming 
 
Cyberwar means the use of computers to disrupt the activities of an enemy 
country, especially the deliberate attacking of communication systems [15]. 
Cyberwar is digital means to conduct espionage, damage information systems, 
make financial damage, and manipulate national critical infrastructures. 
Cyberwar is used in conflicts between governments, between citizens, and 
between government and civilian society. [26] 
 
From wargaming point of view cyberwar is not a separate way to influence, it is 
related to real-world real objectives. To understand the impact of intermodulation 
of real-word and cyberwar is the key to bring cyberwar into military wargaming 
as a way to impact. The most important thing is to find out how the cyberspace 
related issues affect real-world functions and how the functions of the real-world 
impact in cyberspace. The cyberwar is either the cyberwar as a weapon in 
wargaming or wargame is focusing only on cyberwar methods in cyberspace. 
[26; 27] 
 
Cyber defence is the military aspect to cyber security. Some sources define cyber 
defence as defensive function and the protection of information system, but in 
Finland the term cyber defence is referred to a way that includes all military 
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actions taken to protect, attack, or exploit our own or adversaries information and 
computer systems. [28] 
 
Cyber defence as part of the wargaming can be looked from two different points 
of views, a defence and a threat perspective. [1; 5; 26; 29; 30] 
 
Looking from the defence point of view the cyber defence is divisible into two 
parts, a technical and a method of operation. The technical cyber defence 
capabilities include, for example, access control to information networks, 
antivirus software, firewalls and encryption applications. For example, these 
technical features can give the goodness values that can be used to evaluate the 
influence of attacks during the wargaming. The methods of operation cyber 
defence capabilities includes, for example, how people are trained, how they 
have been practicing and how disciplined they are to follow protocols. During the 
creation of a wargame scenario, these capabilities can be estimated, for example, 
how the attacks affect the operation or how quickly after the attack can the 
defender recover. [1; 5; 26; 29; 30] 
 
 
Figure 2. Cyber defence perspectives from wargaming point of view 
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Looking from the threat point of view the cyber defence is divisible into three 
areas, internal threats, external threats and people as sources of information. The 
internal threats are, for example, disillusioned users, indifferent users, the 
complex data security and the careless communication. Most of the internal treats 
form for the attacker a way to get information, which can be used to carry out 
attacks against systems. To wargaming there should be established as accurate, 
truthful and realistic picture of internal threats, without a cover-up. The external 
threat includes, for example, activists, criminals and organizations as well as 
state actors. To wargaming cyber defence, the external threats represent a 
potential attacker. People as sources of information, includes, for example, data 
mining, data phishing, material theft and cheating. [1; 5; 26; 29; 30] 
 
The wargaming can be used in cyber defence for three main purposes, training, 
planning, and discovery. [1; 5; 26; 29; 30] 
 
 
Figure 3. Cyber defence purpose from wargaming point of view 
 
The training includes, for example, a technical experimentation, education and 
training activities under process. The planning includes a war planning. In the 
war planning a wargaming is regularly used in part of a planning process, mostly 
to develop, compare, and improve courses of action. [17] 
 
The discovery includes, for example, an auditing, post-event analysis, and to be 
able to know the unknown. The audit may wargaming to assess the functionality 
of a system or a process in relation to the threats, in order to create a complete 
picture of the activities, including people, systems and guidelines. By wargaming 
the event there can be made an estimate on those parts of the event that have 
been left to the shadows. The estimate can consider the possible background to 
the event, how the event should be resolved, how the responsibilities should be 
divided into resolving the event, and how to prevent in advance the event from 
happening again. By using a wargame with cyberwar elements it is maybe 
possible to find out something what is not know about, to known the unknown. 
[1; 5; 26; 29; 30] 
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2.4 Differences to traditional wargaming 
 
Cyberwar as a part of wargaming brings a slightly different functional 
component to wargaming. The time of the effect is extremely faster related to 
traditional wargaming components. Attacking and defensive measures can be 
seconds or even faster. 
 
The actors in cyberwar are more varied. The target can’t be sure who or which 
organization is behind the attack, or activities. The most common types of 
operator categories are cyber crime, activists, government and agencies, terrorists 
and individual people. In addition, the motives of the action or the objectives of 
the action are also very challenging to figure out. Operation of the source and 
motives can be, and usually are, masked so that is not possible to directly prove 
who did what. [26; 7] In a traditional wargaming out very clearly indicate who 
was attacker.  
 
The cyberwar battlefield can be global. Information networks are globally linked 
in some way to each other, so the operators do not necessarily work in the same 
battlefield as the traditional wargaming components. [27] In a traditional 
wargaming on the map are described in unit’s locations, where they physically 
are. Information systems networks and devices can be placed on the same map as 
the units. In the addition to the physical location of the networks they form a 
logical networks that are required to describe their own maps. 
 
In cyberwar the intelligence (surveillance, reconnaissance, etc.) is more 
meaningful compared to conventional warfare. Intelligence must be more 
detailed and must influence the chains of inquire fully to the end, so the effect 
can be obtained. Validity of intelligence information measured in time can be 
very short because of changes in systems and networks or systems have already 
to been inquired years in advance if any changes have not been done to the 
systems. [27] For example, if the attack is directed against the data, there maybe 
need to reconnaissance the network level, the host level, the application level, 
access controls at the application level, and encryption at the data level [10]. 
 
The legal status of the operator and the target axes will be considered 
challenging. The battlefield is global and the attacker is very challenging to 
comply with all relevant laws along the way. Compliance with the law can set 
actors in very unequal positions. 
 
One impact of a successful attack may be substantially higher than the kinetic 
weapons carried. About the number of attack weapons is not possible to draw 
any conclusions on the effectiveness of the attack. On the other hand, attacker 
must wait to see real-world effects actually occur [26].  
 
The performances of cyberwar weapons are more clandestine than the kinetic 
weapons systems. The possible existence and effects of cyberwar weapons can 
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only be estimated. There may exist advanced operators with unforeseen weapons 
and systems, and the effects can be very imaginative. 
2.5 Cyberwar as a means of effect in wargames 
Cyberwar in wargames focuses on the attackers affect on the defenders systems. 
It can be viewed in either the attacker or defender point of view. In attacker point 
of view, there are two main questions: where to impact or how to impact. In 
defender point of view, the main question is what the target can do. 
 
Looking at the objectives of the attacker cyberwar, there are seven main 
categories against what the attacker can attack [26; 32]: 
 
1) defenders ability to carry out missions, 
2) defender systems capacity, 
3) defenders capability to reach their goals, 
4) defenders capability to obtain information from phase of the their 
missions, 
5) defenders capability to obtain information from the effects of their 
missions, 
6) defenders capability to obtain information which forces are usable, and 
7) defenders capability to obtain information how their forces are usable.  
 
The attackers ways to affect the defender can be divided into six main categories 
[26; 30]: 
 
1) degradation of defender’s systems, 
2) interruption of defender’s systems, 
3) modification of information inside of defender’s systems, 
4) fabrication of false information to defender’s systems, 
5) unauthorization use of defender’s systems and 
6) interception of defender’s information. 
 
The categories of impact can be subdivided to properties against which the 
attacker wants to impact [29; 31]: 
 
1) Communications networks, for example attacks against network 
infrastructure or network services (denial of service). 
2) Hardware systems. The attacker can imbues backdoor to hardware, 
attack against virtualization software or cloud services. 
3) Weak or embedded systems, for example sensors, RFID, mobile 
devices and TVs. 
4) Complex systems, against which the threat can be divided into, for 
example, unforeseen knock-on effect, system manageability and 
verification, hidden characters or the parallelization. 
       31 
5) Data manipulations, for example, privacy and everyday life, the forged 
sensors data and threat to social networks. 
6) The human factors, for example, user interfaces, an insider threats, 
targeted attacks, phishing communication, new ways and opportunities 
to influence people, and safety-critical systems security is more 
important than data security. 
7) Processes. Insufficient safety requirements or practices in information 
security can be divided into, for example, information security that is 
added to the system after the system design, old systems security 
update, All-IP networks and use of COTS components (other system 
found in the exploration of this vulnerability in other systems using 
the same component). 
 
Under the attack the defender has, as a general rule, four ways to react [32]: 
 
1) to continue the activity and use the system under the attack, 
2) to continue the activity and no use the system under the attack, 
3) to wait and to continue the activity when the system is again usable, or 
4) to stop the activity. 
 
Wargame design should create numeric values for each of the different way to 
attack and to defend. It depends on the accuracy of modelling, for example, is 
every hacker, hacker group, or hacking performance have values. Due to the 
nature of the cyberwar there cannot be a single value to describe the attacking or 
defending power, but each assessment should be made of the matrix format, 
which assesses the ability to attack each target or defend against each attack. 
There need to define to the attacker’s ability to attack and at least the attacker’s 
ability to reconnoitre, to remain secret, and hide tracks. To the defender there 
must specify at least the ability to reconnoitre, to detect attacks, to investigate 
events, and to make counterattacks. 
 
Attack 
values 
Hacker A Hacker B Worm A Criminal 1 
Server A 3 9 1 8 
Firewall A 7 1 0 2 
Scada W 10 4 0 0 
Webserver 1 2 9 13 12 
 
Table 1. Example matrix from attacking values 
 
In addition, there should be determine what kind of means of attacking and 
defending is possible to carry out. For example, the attack against SCADA 
system, the attacker must have known vulnerabilities, which make use of or 
access to the system. After successfully attack or defence operation there should 
be determined how is affected to target. There can use, for example, one or more 
32 
earlier mentioned six ways to affect, degradation, interruption, modification, 
fabrication, unauthorization use, or interception. 
 
The resolution of details must pay attention, that the wargame should be 
playable. If played in the system protect against attacks, there can go the 
precision of the individual vulnerabilities. Looking at the defence of critical 
infrastructures, the accuracy should not to go capabilities of every person or 
computer, if there is not computerized system to helping game managers to 
simulate events. 
3 Conclusion 
 
Wargaming can be obtained by the perceptions and experiences of network-
centric warfare as part of the critical infrastructure defence. It facilitates planning 
and preparedness as well as allows participants of the wargame to experience 
accumulation of difficult characters on the network-centric warfare. In addition, 
the wargaming teaches the participants the importance of critical infrastructure. 
 
Wargaming cyberwar concerning critical infrastructure defence forces the 
participants continually to checking the credibility and feasibility of their 
decisions and actions taken, and what information was needed to make the 
decisions. Wargames offer a safe, implicit reflection of some of the situational 
and decision dynamics associated with cyberwar. A proper opponent generates 
and action and reaction feedback loop that produces insights much more 
powerful than a single opinion, however well informed. 
 
The cyberwar components in wargames, that dealing with the critical 
infrastructure in network-centric defence, can be used to create estimates on the 
impact of the cyberwar components in critical infrastructure defence. Wargaming 
can be used to threat analysis, as a training activity, and as a research and 
planning tool. A wargame can create an estimate of the functioning of the whole 
system, including people, equipment and instructions. 
 
Threat analysis related to the wargaming can be used to identify weaknesses in 
the systems and to evaluate what is the probability of potential attacks. Threats 
can be detected through the analysis of the effectiveness of an attack and what 
counter-measures can be used. After the analyses there can be made assessment 
on what protective measures are reasonable to do. 
 
Training activities include, from the cyberwar point of view, technical training, 
security training, and leadership and management training. By wargaming there 
can be practiced, for example, the acts of various authorities and other actors in a 
conjunction with each other. When the critical infrastructure challenges are 
identified training can improve the performance of the operators. Wargaming can 
illustrate their scope and effectiveness, clarify management, find out the 
information sharing needs, to identify critical systems, their technologies 
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weaknesses, identify the interdependences and identify the critical infrastructure 
as a part of asymmetric warfare. 
 
By wargaming cyberwar there can be done research about the necessary 
legislation issues, as well as to assess the nature of the legal consequences of 
different actors. Cyberwar is a relatively new case from a legal perspective. 
Wargaming can provide an opportunity to illustrate what kind of cyberwar is, and 
to raise the necessary legal issues. 
 
In the context of the war planning and resource allocation, wargaming can 
produce estimates how various cyberwar assets can impact to an estimated 
outcome. Estimates can make use of when making a decision with limited 
resource, how to protect the systems best or how to affect to the enemy systems. 
Cyberwar development is rapid compared to the conventional weapons 
technology. Therefore, the war planning context, comes into warpaly plans more 
frequently than in the past. 
 
Leaders in strategic level must take necessary steps to prevent a surprise military 
attack, also in cyberspace. The big challenge in cyberwar is to get to know are 
you under an attack and how is the real attacker. Leaders must understand this 
issue because the risk of being deceived is much higher than in traditional 
warfare. 
 
The defence of critical infrastructure cannot be practiced in reality. Critical 
infrastructure system cannot be turned off. Playing a wargame in which the 
events are simulated can practice how to operate critical infrastructure when part 
of it is disabled.  
 
4 Discussion  
 
”It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be 
imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know 
yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor 
yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.” 
Sun Tzu, ”The Art of War” 
 
In accordance with the preceding quote from Su Tzu comes to know yourself and 
your enemy can give you forehand. Wargaming allows for this. In providing the 
ability to create understanding of a complex issue, it can also create the illusion 
of knowing things. Therefore wargaming end results will be to examine 
critically. All activities, in which the person is involved, cannot be established 
definitely in models. 
 
Wargaming also has decided weaknesses. Preparation is laborious and players 
have to be well qualified for their assigned roles. Wargames conducted by 
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inexperienced players may have large educational pay-off, but the significance of 
results is always suspected. 
 
In the wargame design there must maintain a balance between detailed modelling 
and playability between. This relationship must be considered when designing 
the wargame to set the research issues. If the wargame is designed to look at the 
different authorities’ responsibilities, it is not appropriate to model the things 
individual component accuracy. 
 
Wargaming is used to explore and to discover what we do not know. Wargames 
places the participants to situations, where they must make decisions, which are 
not based on clear and complete understanding of the situation and its facts. The 
real challenge is to make wargame that can help to get the reflections on the 
matters that are not known. Admiral Chester Nimitz said that in Naval War 
College they have re-enacted war with Japan in the game rooms so many 
different ways, that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise. 
Absolutely nothing except the kamikaze tactics. 
 
A wargame is an effective way in building a united view of the important key 
factors to the participants. It gives the participants new insights of cyber warfare 
in network-centric critical infrastructure defence. By wargaming, problems may 
be investigated in wide perspective. This is important when connections are 
weakly understood and critical features cannot be isolated. Conventional 
methods of analysis become then difficult if now impossible. 
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Abstract  
Purpose and research method 
 
The purpose of this article is to present a framework and a method for cyber-
target categorization. The framework contains factors, which influence on cyber 
targeting process and the presented categorization method provides an example, 
how cyber-targets could be categorized to support targeting decision making.  
 
The article is based on literature study. Research method was to build an analogy 
between conventional and cyber targeting.  
Findings and originality 
 
Cyber targeting does not seem to be studied widely, but the common approach to 
cyber security seems to be “threat-based”. This article presents a new 
categorization criteria and method for cyber-target analyze, with a target-based 
approach.  
Keywords  
Cyber-target, targeting, cyber targeting 
 
1 Introduction 
Importance 
 
Targeting is an important component of the effect-based warfare. According to 
AFDD (Air Force Doctrine Document) 3-60 targeting during conflict enables air 
and space power to be a decisive force in modern warfare [1]. In effect-based 
cyber warfare, targeting is as needed component as in conventional warfare. In 
cyber warfare, there is a clear difference between targeted operations and 
“pointless” use of malware. 
 
Conventional targeting is the process for selecting and prioritizing targets and 
matching appropriate actions to those targets to create desired effects that achieve 
objectives, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities [1]. 
Structured target analysis can support targeting process to achieve commander’s 
objectives. In this article, target analysis means basically target categorization for 
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the targeting process. The objective of the target analysis is to identify both 
valuable and available targets. 
 
Research method 
 
The objective of this article was to create new criteria for categorizing cyber-
targets. The research question was: How cyber-targets should be categorized to 
support targeting. The research method was to build an analogy between 
conventional and cyber targeting. Method considered comparison between 
conventional and cyber: targeting, infrastructure, weaponeering and target. 
 
The main result of the research is a proposal about the criteria for cyber-target 
categorization. The results of the research can be used in cyber targeting process. 
Additionally the presented methodology can be used to improve cyber security. 
 
Research framework 
 
The research question was divided into sub questions as follows: 
 
- What is the framework for cyber targeting? 
- Which factors influence cyber targeting? 
- Which are the essential features of the cyber-targets considering effect-
based targeting process. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The approach to the literature study. The conventional targeting 
process is examined in cyberspace. Approach considers cyber-target features, 
cyber-target value and cyber-target availability. 
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In the article, the conventional targeting process was examined to provide the 
base for the analogy. Then the different approaches for evaluating target value 
and availability were examined. Previous research related exactly to cyber 
targeting was not available. However there were supporting research about, cyber 
security, cyber weapons and cyber warfare. The approach to the literature study 
is presented in Figure 1.  
 
2 Targeting process and target 
Background 
 
Targeting is the key element of effect based warfare. If the commander wishes to 
produce the maximum effect with minimal effort, targets have to be chosen 
carefully. If the commander uses his/her power like in Verdun, for example, 
enormous resources can be used and lost without gaining any advance. Beside 
the desired effect, careful targeting facilitates avoiding collateral damage against 
civilian targets while executing military operations. Targeting process can to be 
used in both cyber warfare as in conventional war to pick up the most suitable 
targets. 
 
According to AFDD 3-12, the cyber tasking order is analogous to an air tasking 
order [2]. In cyber warfare, the role of targeting is actually emphasized compared 
to conventional targeting, as the cyber weapons are more target sensitive than 
conventional weapons. For example, a mortar can cause damage both against 
armoured or unarmoured targets, but a Windows operating system exploit can be 
totally useless in Linux environment.  
 
Targeting process 
 
In this article, targeting process is examined with US Air Force Targeting 
Doctrine Document and FAS (Federation of American Scientists) JCS Joint 
Publications related to targeting. 
 
Targeting process is systematic evaluation of potential target systems and their 
components to determine which elements of the target system(s) should, or 
could, be taken against to achieve the given objectives [3]. The end product of 
the target development process is an unconstrained prioritized list of potential 
targets. It reflects relative importance of targets to the enemy's ability to wage 
war. This list of targets is the basis for the weaponeering phase, where own 
capabilities are evaluated against the suitable targets [3]. 
 
Joint targeting cycle contains six different phases. In the first phase, the strategic 
level objectives are established. The second phase contains the target 
development, vetting, validation, nomination and prioritization phase. In this 
phase, the potential target systems are systematically examined. In the third 
phase, own capabilities against desired effects are evaluated. In the fourth phase, 
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commander makes decision and approves the target list. In the fifth phase, 
missions are planned and the final phase considers assessment [1]. 
 
One important notice about the targeting cycle is that it is iterative and the 
following phase may have an influence on the previous one [1]. The cyber 
tasking cycle, which is based on the air tasking cycle, is also an iterative process 
[2].  
 
Most of all, targeting process needs information about the possible targets. One 
absolute demand for any target is that the target has to be available for 
reconnaissance. If the target cannot be evaluated in advance, or the effect on the 
target cannot be observed, the target should not be nominated at all.  
 
Target characteristics 
 
Targets are evaluated and categorized with target characteristics. Every target has 
certain characteristics, which form the basis for the target detection, location, 
identification, and classification for future surveillance, analysis, strike, and 
assessment. In general, there are four categories of characteristics by which 
conventional targets can be defined: physical, environmental, functional, and 
cognitive. [1]  
 
The physical features key characteristics of the target are: shape, appearance, 
number and nature of elements, reflectivity, structural composition, degree of 
hardening, electromagnetic radiation, location, size and dispersion. An example 
about environmental characteristics is terrain features. Cognitive features are, for 
example: how the target processes information, information that target requires to 
function, outputs to the processes the target performs, how much information the 
target can handle and how the target or system stores information. Functional 
features are, for example, what materials or resources the target requires to 
function. [1]  
 
Converting physical and environmental characteristics into cyber space can be 
done by transforming them into virtual characteristics and IT infrastructure 
features. Physical characteristics would transform into cyber target's virtual 
characteristics, such as operating system, needed CPU efficiency, needed 
memory size and file or data formats. Cyber-target may also have an interface to 
physical space, which allows attacker to penetrate into cyber-target system 
through a physical connection. Environmental characteristics would consider 
network characteristics such as network protocols, layers, servers’ operating 
systems and databases – in other words the IT infrastructure characteristics. 
 
Functional characteristics consider what the cyber target does. For example, 
these characteristics would be target's mobility, ability to defend and reconstitute 
it. These characteristics are quite similar between the cyber-target and 
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conventional target. Cognitive features are, for example, how the target processes 
information, process input and output and how the target stores information. [1]  
 
Overall physical and environmental characteristics have to be transformed into 
virtual characteristics and the functional and cognitive features are very similar in 
the physical or cyber space. The analogy between physical and cyber 
characteristics is illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Analogy between conventional and cyber-target characteristics 
 
Weaponeering 
 
Weaponeering means basically choosing the most effective and suitable weapon 
against the chosen target. Weaponeering can be seen as certain kind of 
optimisation. Some of the modern weapons are expensive and should be used 
after careful consideration. To be effective, targeting process must identify the 
best weapon for the intended target with appropriate timing to meet the 
objectives established by the commander. Weaponeering determines the quantity, 
type, and mix of lethal and nonlethal weapons required to achieve a specific level 
of target damage. [3] 
 
Cyber-weaponeering itself is very target sensitive. Software exploits are useful 
only against certain vulnerabilities and totally useless against other cyber-targets. 
However, some cyber-attack methods, like denial of service attacks, can be used 
against several target systems. 
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Examples about cyber weapons and cyber-attacks against SCADA (Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition) systems are [4]: 
 
Denial of service attacks to cause system shutdown. 
- Deleting system files to cause system shutdown. Attack may not be 
avoided by reboot. 
- Taking control of SCADA system. With this type of attack, an attacker 
may cause several kind of damage. 
- Changing data in SCADA system. 
 
3 Target Value 
Concept 
 
Target value means, how important the target is for the enemy's functionality. 
The reason for target value evaluation is that the attacker is able to choose those 
targets, which will cause the whole target system to collapse, after destroying the 
chosen targets. In conventional warfare, enemy commanding and 
communications functions are commonly seen as valuable targets. On nation 
level, critical infrastructures can also be seen as very high level targets. 
Protection of critical infrastructure such as water, power and energy is vital, 
because of the impact the destruction of the critical infrastructure would cause 
[5].  
 
As the defender wants to protect the softest and critical targets, attacker wants to 
find and destroy the same targets. Because of this, both the attacker and defender 
can use similar analyse methods to find the critical points. The more critical the 
target is, the more valuable it is for targeting. 
 
Network theory approach 
 
In network theory approach, the critical infrastructure is modelled as a network to 
identify the critical nodes and links. Scale-free network theory establishes a basis 
for vulnerability analysis, because it reveals concentrations of assets that may be 
vulnerable for an attack. [5] 
 
With the network theory approach, the most critical nodes or links can be 
identified in the critical infrastructure. If the attacker manages to effect on these 
critical points, the whole critical infrastructure may be paralyzed with minimal 
effort. Network theory approach is suitable also for the defender. As the attacker 
wishes to find and destroy the critical nodes, defender can try to protect, harden, 
duplicate etc. the critical nodes and links to increase the security. 
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Systems theory approach 
 
Systems theory approach can be used after or beside the network analysis. 
Systems theory approach provides information on how complex systems interact 
with their environment, and this guidance can be applied to designing security. 
With systems theory approach, security designers are able to build layered 
defence on the target system [6]. The goal of the security is to ensure the critical 
functions. With systems theory approach, instead of identifying the threats in the 
system, losses are identified. The question is, what essential services and 
functions must be secured against disruptions and what are the unacceptable level 
of losses. [7]  
 
With systems theory approach, the control, input, output and components in the 
target system are identified [6]. By totally destroying control or one of these 
functions, the whole system may be paralyzed with minimal effort. Besides the 
control, every function is essential for the output of the process. Process can be 
destroyed also by destroying a single function or by producing enough damage 
for every function.  
 
Effect on the target network or system 
 
When evaluating target value and the effect on the target system, target’s 
importance for the target system or target network has to be studied, as the 
importance differs between critical components. In causality model, an initial 
component failure cascades through a set of other components [7]. Cascade 
failures are system-wide failures that begin with on single failure, but propagate 
throughout the entire system or network, ending in calamity [5]. With cascading 
effect, paralysing a single node, link of function, the whole target system or 
target infrastructure can be damaged. To avoid collateral damage and other 
unwanted effects, which cascading effect may cause, the meaning and 
functionality of the chosen cyber-target has to be known in advance.  
 
Other target value characteristic may be target’s capability to recover from the 
attack. For example, denial of service attack may not cause any permanent 
damage. Business systems may recover from an attack by simply rebooting the 
target system. But, for example, in industrial control systems reboot cannot be 
used as easily to solve problems as in enterprise environment [8]. Rebooting a 
SCADA system may cause the shutdown of the power plant of production 
facility, which cannot be done without preparations.  
 
On the other hand, fault-tolerant networks continue to function even when some 
of the nodes or links do not operate [5]. An attack against a single critical 
component in the fault-tolerant system, can be totally useless for the attacker. 
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Levels of the cyber target 
 
In cyber warfare research, cyber targets seem to be discussed only on very high 
level – as large infrastructure targets or whole information systems, or the 
concept of cyber target is not deeply analysed.  
 
The chosen method to analyse a critical infrastructure or a target system 
influence on the targeting process. For example, a target system can be seen as a 
group of potential cyber-targets for the targeting process. According to 
Federation of American Scientists, military targets may be further classified as 
strategic, operational, and tactical [3]. While planning a cyber-attack, the target 
cannot be examined on system or network level, but the target system has to be 
divided into target and target entity levels. This is similar in conventional warfare 
as an anti-tank weapon can fire against a single tank, but not the whole tank 
division.  
 
Cyber-target may be divided into different categories based on the level of the 
target. The highest level of the cyber-target concept would be cyber-target 
system, which is formed from the subsystems, and is the main objective of the 
attack. This could be, for example, SCADA or a flight control system. Cyber-
targets would be single functions and subsystems, which are needed to make the 
whole system to function.  
 
Cyber-target entity is a part of cyber-target which can be destroyed individually, 
but it is essential for the target system to operate. Cyber-target entity could be a 
single process, file, a sensor or a single function. Cyber-target entities are 
autonomous with simple behaviours and connect together and form a service. 
The levels of cyber-target are illustrated in Figure 3. For effect based warfare, it 
is essential to choose the correct target entity in the correct target system. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Levels of the cyber-target. 
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On cyber-target system level, possible systems could be SCADA or other 
information systems, network and network communications or organizations IT-
infrastructure containing, for example, data storages, office software and identity 
handling systems. SCADA is a system to automate industrial control and 
monitoring [8]. SCADA systems are composed of computers, network 
communications, sensors, remote units and programmable logic controllers [5]. 
The complex and distributed structure of SCADA creates several attack vectors 
against it. 
 
Cyber-target system can also be a hybrid, which exists in both in the cyber and 
the physical space. With a cyber-target system, an end user can also be 
influenced through the system, even when he/she does not exist in cyber space, 
or the target may be a physical device. 
 
The ultimate objective of a cyber-attack may locate in the physical layer of the 
cyber space, or it may be the human actor above the application layer, or it may 
be inside the cyber space itself. 
 
4 Target Availability 
Concept 
 
Target availability means how easy the target is to reconnoitre and destroy. The 
basic method for target availability analysis is to divide targets to “soft” and 
“hard” targets.  
 
The actual target analysis can be carried out using several methods. Because the 
decision making process is constrained by time, costs, previous experiences, and 
perceptions of the participants, a great deal of decision making in the target 
development arena is based on qualitative rather than quantitative analysis. 
However, qualitative analysis is not a substitute for quantitative analysis. Both 
are useful techniques for structuring a problem to reach a rational conclusion. 
Both may be used to reduce uncertainty in decision making. [3] 
 
The key elements of the target availability are: 1) target defence and 2) target 
vulnerability.  
 
Cyber-target system defence contains [4; 6; 7; 8; 11]:  
 
- Access control (firewall for example) 
- Anti-malware 
- Encryption 
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- Intrusion detection systems 
- Backups and mitigation. 
- System hardening 
- Honeypot to distract the attacker 
 
Cyber target vulnerability can be evaluated with CIA (information 
confidentiality, integrity and availability) approach. With this approach the 
information is seen as a target and the objective is to influence on the 1) 
information confidentiality by revealing secret information, 2) information 
integrity by removing or alternating information or 3) information availability by 
denying users to gain access to desired information.  
 
Cyber weapon target analysis 
 
In cyber weapon target analysis, the cost of achieving the target is evaluated with 
certain criteria. With cyber weapon systems, the cost of achievement analysis is 
conducted by considering the cyber weapon system functions and the 
components of the cyber-attack, to gain the overall understanding about the 
chosen cyber-target system. The evaluation should consider: 
 
1) Possibility for the initial penetration into target’s cyberspace. 
2) Possibility to operate in the cyber-target system containing: 
a) Searching 
b) Identifying 
c) Spreading 
d) Connecting to C2 servers 
e) Communications with peers 
f) Evaluating the situation 
3) Possibility to influence the cyber-target and cyber-target entity. 
4) Possibility to evaluate the caused effect on the cyber-target system. 
5) Possibility to avoid cyber-target system's countermeasures. 
 
For a successful attack, the cyber weapon system has to be able to perform all 
these actions. [9] 
 
5 Target reconnaissance 
Concept 
 
Reconnaissance attacks allow an attacker to identify potential cyber-targets in 
advance [10]. To be able to gather all the information needed for the targeting 
process, the cyber-target has to be easy enough to reconnoiter. If the target 
system is a ”black box” and there is no information available about its 
functionality and features, the target can be seen as very hard target to influence.  
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Public information 
 
Public information means information which is legally available for anyone. 
Some of the target system information may be online and available for anyone 
through the internet. Software and hardware manufactures usually provide 
documentation and other online information about their products. Information 
may contain, for example, default passwords and configuration. Inquiring public 
information is legal and can be done with home PC through internet. 
 
Network devices can be seen as easier targets for reconnaissance, because the 
documentation is usually available in the internet. For example, information 
about SCADA systems, programmable logic controllers etc. can be found from 
online documentation available for anyone [4]. This makes them possible critical 
infrastructure targets, because control systems security is of prime importance for 
example for energy sector [8]. 
 
Public information may be easily inquired with, for example, search engines. If 
the device type and serial number are known, critical information about cyber-
targets features and functionality can be found easily. Additionally the usage of 
common technologies, such as TCP/IP and common operating systems, makes 
the target systems easier to reconnoiter [4]. 
 
Hidden information 
 
In this article, hidden information means information, which is not publically 
available. Revealing hidden information is usually illegal or revealing it requires 
illegal methods and tools. Usually the search of hidden information is done after 
all the public information is already gathered. Methods for searching hidden 
information can be technical or social engineering.  
 
Usually the search of hidden information requires more sophisticated software 
tools and skills than the search of public information. Attacker has to be able to 
use tools like Netcat, Nessus and NMAP, and he/she has to be able to evaluate 
the results.  
 
During reconnaissance attackers identify systems and then finger print the 
connected systems. Finger printing means finding out which ports are open and 
identifying version of the remote operating system [10; 11]. 
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Social engineering means obtaining hidden information using human 
vulnerabilities. There are various techniques to commit social engineering. One 
of the effective features with social engineering is, that target may not even 
realize being under reconnaissance. [12]  
6 Conclusion 
 
Based on the approaches presented in the chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, it is possible to 
build a categorization method for evaluation cyber-targets for cyber targeting 
process. The factors influencing on target categorization are presented in Figure 
4 and the proposal for the cyber-target categorization is presented in Table 1.  
 
First of all, targeter has to be able to reconnoitre the cyber-target. The easier it is 
to gain information about the target, the easier it is to analyse the target. One 
important notice is, that also the effect on the target has to be assessed. Cyber-
targets using common commercial software and hardware and common protocols 
can be inquired more easily than “black box” or legacy systems, which have old 
and tailored software, which may not be well documented. Hiding information is 
not an inclusive solution, because there are methods for revealing hidden 
information technically or with social engineering.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Target categorization criteria 
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With target analyse, there has to be a clear understanding about the levels of the 
target. Target value has to be examined based on the effect on the system or 
infrastructure level. After the cyber-target system is chosen, targeter has to 
identify the critical targets inside the target system. After identifying the targets, 
targeter can choose the correct cyber-target entities to be affected. Good features 
for the target are possible cascading effect and poor capability to recover. 
 
Availability means that attacker is really able to affect the valuable target. 
Attacker has to be able to connect to target’s cyber space. Internet access makes 
target systems easier to attack, when there is no need for physical connection. 
Remote connections enable attacks from the distance without entering to the 
target system area geographically.  
 
Good target defence can prevent the attack in advance. If the target systems has 
reliable access control and intrusion detection system, it decreases attacker 
capability to operate in the target system. Encryption can hide critical 
information and possible use of honey pots create contingency for the operation. 
 
Weaponeering is highlighted in cyber-attack. Cyber weapons are much more 
target sensitive than conventional weapons. Exploits are useful only against 
certain vulnerabilities. For the weaponeering, targeter has to gain a great deal 
technical information, such as operating systems, software versions, updates and 
configuration – in other words information about target’s characteristics.  
 
After all, the final objective is to influence a cyber-target entity. Target entity’s 
information has to be affected and one or several tenets of target’s CIA must be 
compromised. For this objective, target-entities’ features must be known. Cyber-
target entity has to be chosen carefully. Influencing right entity in the wrong 
system or vice versa, makes an attack ineffective. Information needed about 
cyber-entity contains the nature of the entity, environmental features such as 
operating system and protocols and hardware.  
 
Cyber-target  
Reconnaissance White box vs. Black box 
Value Critical vs. easy to replace 
Availability Available vs. unavailable 
Target defence Soft target vs. hard target 
Weaponeering Suitable weapons considering 
target characteristics 
CIA Cyber entity features 
 
Table 1. Categorization method for cyber-targets 
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7 Discussion 
 
The role of targeting seems to even increase in cyber warfare compared to 
conventional targeting. Cyber weapons can be totally useless in wrong kind of 
virtual environment and cyber-weaponeering is very target sensitive. There is a 
clear difference between targeted attack and “pointless” use of malware. 
Targeted cyber operations save resources, increase results and reduce collateral 
damage.  
 
The conventional targeting process is a suitable approach also with cyber 
targeting and similar functions can be used with cyber-targets, but the importance 
and signification may differ. For example, available weapons influence a great 
deal on which target characteristics are important to reveal. On the other hand, 
cyber weapons can also be manufactured faster than conventional weapons and 
found opportunities may be more easily exploited. 
 
There seems to be several methods for defender to turn his/her system as a 
“hard” target and avoid the attack in advance. These methods consider reducing 
single targets value and availability. The most useful defence method could be 
layered defence, where the first step would be hiding the systems existence, 
functionality and characteristics.  
 
This article bases on literature study and presents only a proposal about cyber-
target categorization. Presented criteria for cyber-target categorization should be 
evaluated in future research. Especially the weight of each presented 
categorization criteria, should be evaluated during an actual cyber-targeting 
process. 
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Abstract  
Purpose 
 
SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) is widely used type of 
different Industrial Control Systems (ICS). This article describes the system and 
how it is related to critical infrastructure and why cyber security of such systems 
should matter in the context of national security in Finland and other developed 
countries. SCADA systems today face similar cyber vulnerabilities than other 
information systems and measures are needed to make these industrial control 
systems more secure. However, SCADA systems are in many ways different 
from typical corporate networks and services and pose certain challenges that are 
non-existing on more traditional IT systems. This article should give a reader 
which is familiar with IT security in typical corporate or government 
environments some insight to SCADA systems and the challenges lying in 
Industrial Control Systems in general. On the other hand, industrial automation 
engineers, technicians and students in this field without the expertise on IT 
security itself may find some new insight on the cyber security properties of 
industrial control systems.  
 
Design/methodology/approach 
 
This article is based on a collection of literature, academic research papers, 
conference presentations and official documents mainly from United States and 
Finland.  This article tries to find a compact overview on the problem without 
going too deep in technological details. As SCADA cyber security in the context 
of national security and critical infrastructure is not only technology, we also 
approach the subject through security studies and try to find a reason why 
SCADA cyber security should matter on national scale.   
 
Findings 
 
SCADA and industrial control system cyber security is a widely researched 
subject, especially in the United States. Challenges of SCADA cyber security are 
well understood, but implementation of effective information security and cyber 
defence measures is often difficult because of different technological limitations 
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and also because of the expenses. In Finland, with the new emphasis on cyber 
security on national level, the cyber security of industrial control systems and 
critical infrastructure in general will hopefully see new development in the 
upcoming years.  
Originality/value 
 
As described, this article is based on published academic papers and other 
publically available documents and as such, it tries to give a compact enough 
overview for those who find themselves new or unfamiliar to the subject instead 
of approaching a certain problem that most of the academic papers do.  There is 
also relatively little publications or even thesis works made of the subject in 
Finland and as such, those parts of the research concerning the current situation 
and future in Finland have original information. As this article tries to see the 
“big picture” of SCADA cyber security and not only focuses in engineering or 
technical aspects, there was a need to approach the problem through security 
studies and thus explain why SCADA is important for national security. This 
interdisciplinary approach is rarely used in more technical documents of the 
subject.  
Keywords  
SCADA, Industrial Control Systems, Critical Infrastructure, Cyber Security 
 
Paper type 
 
Research paper 
 
1 Introduction 
 
SCADA systems are widely used industrial control systems throughout the 
world. In the history they were largely fully proprietary systems, but through 
standardization and with general advancements in technology starting from the 
late 1980’s, commercial-on-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and the use of Internet 
Protocol technologies are nowadays common in industrial control systems. 
Aspects such as interoperability requirements, system cost and expandability are 
playing ever larger role in the design which again has put pressure on the need to 
move away from proprietary systems. At the same time it has become possible to 
link industrial control systems to other networks and services. All this 
development during two or three decades has exposed SCADA systems to 
similar cyber threats that we see with other IT systems. What makes this situation 
worrying is the fact that SCADA systems are used in industries that are 
considered as critical in many countries.  
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There is substantial amount of research done in different research institutes, 
laboratories and academia throughout the world on the subject. Research gained 
momentum soon after 9/11 in the United States and has continued since 
throughout the world. Stuxnet incident in 2010 was another milestone, which 
caused rising interest in industrial control system cyber security in many 
countries. Although problems are quite well understood, there is still a lot work 
to do in the implementation of improvements both on the security processes and 
systems.      
 
There are good research enhancement possibilities on the subject in Finland, as 
amount of publically available research here is still relatively low. After the 
release of national cyber strategy implementation plan in the spring of 2014, 
there is a need to gain more understanding on the current local situation of our 
critical industrial control systems and how it affects our national security. 
 
2 SCADA system overview 
 
To understand the nature and operation of SCADA, let’s first look at the main 
components of a typical Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
system. In short, SCADA systems are industrial automated process control 
systems which are used to monitor and control process equipment in many 
industries such as electric production and distribution, gas and oil refining and 
distribution as well as water and waste water delivery and purification systems. 
Definitions for SCADA systems tend to differ in detail somewhat depending on 
the source, but generally, it is represented as consisting of four main components:  
 
1. There are one or more field devices on a remote site or substation, usually 
Remote Terminal Units (RTU), and/or Programmable Logic Controllers 
(PLC). These field devices are practically computers, which consist of 
communications unit and usually several digital and analogue inputs and 
outputs, which again interface the unit to the different sensors or 
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED). IEDs can be for example motors, 
pumps or valve actuators equipped with a microprocessor or controller 
thus allowing the control of the device. PLCs or RTUs can be also 
connected to different relays or switchboxes which again can control 
“dumb” devices without microprocessor logic. [5; 8; 9; 19] 
 
2. SCADA communications system can generally be divided to short and 
long distance communications. Short distance communications are on-site 
communications within the remote site, which connects the field devices 
to the IEDs, relays, switches or sensors. Long distance communications 
are used to transfer data between field devices and the computers in the 
SCADA central host. Short distance communications usually employ 
serial connections over twisted copper pair or LAN networks. Long range 
communications, on the other hand, can be almost anything that is best 
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suited and most cost effective option, which again depends mostly of the 
remote site location, available communication methods there and of the 
distance to the SCADA host. Long distance system can be radio, 
telephone, cable, satellite, etc., or any combination of these. Different 
remote sites in the SCADA system can be equipped with variety of 
aforementioned methods. [5; 8; 9; 19] 
 
Communication protocols used in the system are specialized SCADA-
protocols, which were developed the data models used in RTUs and PLCs 
in mind. Some protocols are suited specifically for the communication 
within the remote site, some are used for the long distance communication 
only and some suit for the both applications. Many of the most popular 
protocols are open protocols and maintained by foundations, international 
organizations or joint groups of manufacturers.  Most of these widely used 
protocols date back in the late 1970’s, 1980’s or early 1990’s and thus 
they were originally developed only for serial communications, but during 
the last 15-20 years, most of them were specified for packet data networks 
such as IP also. Protocols utilize in most cases polling, where a device 
upper in hierarchy (master) polls the information from the lower device 
(slave), although some of the protocols may utilize peer-to-peer operation 
in certain cases. Polling is necessary for serial communications, because 
there can be only one device at a time reserving the communications 
channel. For example, RTU or PLC would be a master and IED a slave 
and again SCADA host computer would be a master to these field devices. 
[5; 8; 9; 19] 
 
Documentation for these popular open protocols is extensive and in many 
cases, available for free or for nominal fee. Along with supported field 
devices, there are several manufactures that produce networking devices 
that can route messages or perform protocol transformations. During the 
last few decades 150–200 SCADA protocols were developed [6]. Most of 
these protocols were rare and closed proprietary standards developed by 
variety of companies. Over the years, open protocols have become most 
common and amount of widely used protocols today is far smaller. Few of 
the most popular protocols used today include MODBUS, PROFIBUS, 
ICCP/TASE.2, DNP3, IEC 60870 and IEC 61850. 
  
3. SCADA host, SCADA master or Master Terminal Unit (MTU) is a 
computer or a set of networked server computers which also provide a 
man-machine operator interface to the SCADA system. SCADA host 
computers process the information gathered from the remote sites and 
send control commands back. Amount of gathered data may be huge, as 
there may be thousands of different sensors and PLCs etc. in the system 
where data is constantly collected. Control room displays and control 
workstations or terminals and associated accessories are connected to the 
host via a LAN or WAN network. [5; 8; 9; 19] 
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Originally, SCADA hosts were largely fully proprietary mainframe 
computers, which meant that the hardware and software could be fully 
developed by a single manufacturer. This also meant that they were 
usually incompatible with devices from other manufacturers and 
expanding the system might prove to be expensive or a difficult task. 
Together with open protocols and with the use of common commercial-
on-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software, interoperability and 
maintenance has become a much easier and cost effective task. Nowadays, 
Linux, Unix or Windows server platforms are commonly used with 
regular or industrial server computers. [5; 8; 9; 19] 
 
SCADA host also includes historian, which is a database of all the 
gathered values and parameters of the system. It is mainly used to validate 
the gathered data values, as data quality plays a big part in SCADA 
systems and long distance connections can be unreliable. [5; 8; 9; 19] 
 
4. Man Machine Interface (MMI) or Human Machine Interface (HMI) is a 
part of the SCADA central host and includes all the control tools that the 
human operator uses for supervising and controlling the processes. It 
consists of software and hardware and the purpose of the MMI is to 
present the gathered data in the form that is understandable by humans. 
Nowadays information is usually presented using computer generated 
graphics through displays. Also, warning lights and sound effects can be 
used to enhance alert messages popping on the screen. Hardware wise, 
MMI may include normal computer accessories, such as mice and 
keyboards as well as customized dashboards with different set of controls. 
It is important to understand, that human operator doesn’t actively control 
the processes in the SCADA system as much of it is automated. Every 
remote site, or outstation, controls the process most of the time 
automatically by using its PLCs and RTUs with set parameters. Also, 
SCADA central host can give automated control commands to substation, 
if necessary. This independent operation of the system is important, 
because the long distance connections aren’t reliable and system needs to 
work a short time even if the connections between central host and the 
remote site are temporarily down or data corruption occurs. That is why 
operator’s main function is to supervise the process and human 
intervention is mainly required only when something unexpected happens. 
[5; 8; 9; 19]  
 
Along with the main components of a SCADA system listed above, there can be 
several other networks or servers connected to the SCADA network and host. 
Originally SCADA systems where usually fully isolated without connections to 
outside world, but nowadays information is in many cases sent and received from 
a variety different information systems. For example, information from SCADA 
host can be used for billing purposes and for that, SCADA host has a gateway to 
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the corporate network and associated systems there. Directory services and 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) or Geographical Information Systems (GIS) 
may be also linked with the SCADA. [19] 
 
Typically, SCADA systems also include engineering workstations, which are 
used for the programming and configuring of the PLCs and RTUs. Engineering 
workstations run a specialized software for this purpose. Updates to the PLCs 
and RTUs can be sent to remote sites via network or by a technician on site. In 
the network, with all the routers, switches and modems, front end computers can 
be used as a data gathering nodes. Also, large SCADA systems may consist of 
several control rooms and hosts, which are again connected together. [8; 10; 17] 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Basic SCADA layout [17] 
 
SCADA systems are easily mixed with other industrial control system called 
Distributed Control System (DCS). DCS systems, although consisting of many 
same components such as PLCs, are very different in operation compared to 
SCADA. SCADA systems usually occupy a large geographical area as DCS 
systems are typically limited to one plant area. DCS systems are designed to 
control a complex process on the site usually by using a closed loop control 
scheme over fast and reliable connections thus making real time control of the 
process even more pronounced than it is for SCADA systems. On the other hand, 
because of the SCADA’s wide area and somewhat unreliable long distance 
connections, remote sites has to be able to work independently and system’s 
main function is towards data gathering. Because of the advances in 
communications and networking, these two type of systems have technically 
become more and more similar to each other, but the significant difference 
remains, where SCADA is an information oriented system, where control room is 
at its focal point, while the focus of the DCS systems is the process itself. [25] 
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2 SCADA, critical infrastructure and cyber threat 
 
As described shortly in the beginning of chapter 1, SCADA systems are used in 
the industries, which in most countries are considered as critical infrastructure. 
Different areas of critical infrastructure are important for the survivability and 
wellbeing of the civilian population and for the operation of government itself in 
any developed state. Definitions for critical infrastructure can vary a bit 
depending on the country, but generally it consists of areas such as energy 
production and distribution, public safety, health care, banking and finance, 
transportation, communications and different manufacturing industries. For 
example, without electricity, it doesn’t take long when modern society collapses 
as communication and information systems stop working and buildings cool 
down in the winter. In fact, without electricity, pretty much all the other aspects 
of the critical infrastructure are soon in peril. At the heart of electric distribution 
system are SCADA systems controlling the substations of the electric 
distribution grid. [4] 
 
Cyber warfare and other cyber threats have gained a lot of momentum in the 
media during the last couple of years. Not only within the public and media, 
cyber threats and information security in general have risen also to the political 
debate and in many countries and cyber threats are considered as a potential new 
dimension in the threat maps of the states. It seems, that different nations still see 
the threat very differently. Why then these industrial control systems are or 
should at least be important to us when considering the cyber threat towards 
critical infrastructure in Finland? 
 
Forrest Hare analysed in his paper “The Cyber Threat to National Security: Why 
can’t We Agree?” why different nations among Nato coalition don’t seem to find 
same view on the cyber threat thus making co-operation and finding consensus 
about the problem difficult, although at the same time, nearly every developed 
country sees the cyber threat as a potential problem. He approached the problem 
through the security studies using framework from the Barry Buzan’s “People, 
States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations” as a 
basis. Buzan presented a model in his work, where a combination of national 
power (or weakness) compared to neighbouring countries, and national cohesion 
are deciding factors for the vulnerabilities of the state. National power means 
military power, but a wider aspect, such as economic power can be taken into 
account also.  
 
Hare applied Buzan’s model for cyber security and presented a matrix in his 
work in the same way as Buzan did for the security of state. Hare’s matrix is 
presented in Figure 2. [26] 
    
Hare’s model, as well as Buzan’s, is very relativistic and measuring national 
power or cohesion by absolute numbers is very difficult, if not impossible, but 
comparisons between countries on an international system is still possible.  
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On the figure 1, we can see that cyber attacks on critical infrastructure are the 
defining vulnerability in states, which are relatively weak in power, but on the 
other hand have a strong cohesion. Vice versa, actions that are trying to 
destabilize the society politically are very unlikely to cause significant threat to 
the state in these countries. [26] 
 
As said above, Hare’s table isn’t the absolute measure about the vulnerability of 
the state. It also presents how nations perceive the threat and why consensus is 
difficult to obtain. 
 
Socio-political Cohesion  
Weak Strong 
 
Weak De-stabilizing political actions in cyberspace, attacks on Internet 
infrastructure, criminal activities 
DDOS and other major 
attacks on critical infra- 
structure* 
 
 
Power 
 
Strong De-stabilizing political actions in cyberspace 
Criminal activities in 
cyberspace 
 
Figure 2. Cyber vulnerabilities and Types of States [26] 
 
In the case of Finland, it is quite easy to classify it belonging to the weak powers. 
Although a developed nation, Finland has a small population, natural or other 
resources and military power is small when compared to the major powers and 
even some of the neighbouring countries. Finland’s economy is also quite 
specialized and focused on exports, which makes the economy more vulnerable 
to international crisis and economic down turns.  At the same time, Finland is 
considered as a stable and socially equal state with high regard of civil rights and 
democracy. This places the vulnerability of critical infrastructure as the biggest 
threat towards the national security according to Hare’s model. 
 
Socio-political Cohesion  
Weak Strong 
 
Weak Highly vulnerable to most types of threats 
Particularly vulnerable to mili- 
tary threats 
 
 
Power 
 
Strong 
 
Particularly vulnerable to 
political threats 
Relatively invulnerable to most 
types of threat (less inclined to 
characterize issues as military) 
 
Figure 3. Vulnerabilites and Types of States from People, States and Fear (1991) 
[26] 
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What about the threat itself? Who are the actors causing possible harm to the 
critical infrastructure utilizing cyber space? Are they script kiddies, criminals or 
terrorists? Answer to this can be probably found easily by pure reasoning, but we 
can use Buzan’s original model here as a support. Buzan’s original matrix is 
presented in figure 3. [26] 
 
Here we can see that Finland and other similar states are vulnerable to military 
threats most likely caused by other more powerful states. If we now place these 
two matrixes above each other, we can imagine a picture, where cyber threat 
towards the critical infrastructure is a part of a hostile military operation by a 
more powerful state or by an organization supported by the government with 
adequate resources, motivation and carefully defined objectives.  
 
All this of course doesn’t negate the possibility of some other criminal activities 
in our cyber space with totally different goals and performed by completely 
different actors. It is of no question that a criminal or terrorist group couldn’t 
target our critical infrastructure in cyber space. However, crime or politically 
motivated actions are unlikely to cause a threat to the state itself within the state 
as seen in both matrixes, thus the threat is most likely foreign based. Also, as 
cyber operations are always tied to the real world at least through the motivations 
and objectives of the actors, it is very difficult to see what gain some foreign 
criminal group would achieve by intentionally launching a campaign against the 
information systems of Finland’s critical infrastructure. Extortion and monetary 
gain might of course be possible, but still probably much more unlikely, than a 
threat as a part of military operation. 
 
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is a term that is used of the organizations that 
are well funded and systematically compromise government and commercial 
entities, and which also have the ability and resources to perform these 
sophisticated cyber attacks towards the critical infrastructure and SCADA. 
Typically, term refers to advanced adversaries that are focused on critical data 
and exploiting the information in covert manner. APTs have the resources to 
bypass most of the cyber security software and hardware and establish a long-
term network presence in the target organization. Attacks are stealthy, carefully 
planned, targeted and data focused, which makes them very different from 
traditional computer viruses or worms. [3; 8] 
 
All this means that APT attacks can last very long time. In the case of SCADA, it 
can start with the stealthy intrusion to the target organization’s corporate network 
from Internet and again from there pivoting through the gateways and firewalls 
all the way to the connected SCADA network and thus finally gaining access to 
the SCADA host, MMI and engineering workstations. After this, it can be quite 
simple task to gather data about the operation of the SCADA system as a whole 
and gain access to the RTUs and PLCs in the remote sites. Along with this 
method, it is also possible to perform man-in-the middle attack through the 
unprotected WAN connections. No matter how the attack is performed, all this 
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time the target organization is unaware of the threat while attacker maintains its 
presence in the system without doing any harm at this point to the operation. 
After extensive data collection about the target system, attacker may have a 
complete picture and control of the control process and finally, it is possible to 
launch a harmful attack on the system at almost any time, for example, as a part 
of the larger operation during international crisis. [21; 27] 
 
So, what can be the consequences of a cyber attack on SCADA and other 
industrial control systems? In short, successful attack can delay, block or alter the 
controlled process or the information related to the business operations revolving 
around the process, for example loss of the metrics obtained from the SCADA 
system used for billing purposes. In practice results may vary from financial 
impact of varying scale and minor disruptions in production to life-threatening 
incidents to plant workers and population by the release of hazardous materials to 
the environment after attacker caused a process to run off and disabled all fail 
safes. When we are talking about the critical infrastructure, which is essential for 
the wellbeing of the population and providing working services for the nation as 
a whole, most severe damages can thus pose a threat to the national security 
itself. [8; 16] 
2 SCADA vulnerabilities 
 
SCADA and other industrial control systems in use today were developed in the 
time, where modern networking, personal computers or Internet didn’t exist or 
weren’t used widely in business operations. SCADA systems were fully 
proprietary and physically isolated systems which used their own set of protocols 
throughout the system. From the late 1990’s internet technologies have become 
more and more common in SCADA system design. At the same time, the ability 
to link SCADA and with other services and networks became possible. This also 
meant that they became vulnerable to new cyber threats similar to other IT 
systems. 
 
Air Gap is a term which has still lingered on with SCADA and other ICS 
systems. It is a term that refers to an isolated system and some still believe it is 
possible to maintain such system. But information exchange between ICS 
systems and other services is probably here to stay and even necessary. Even if it 
would be possible to run a certain SCADA system without any connections to 
other networks, patching software and reconfiguring the systems means at least 
that technicians and engineers need to attach USB sticks or other mass storage 
devices and perhaps even computers to the system. If nothing else, Stuxnet 
proved that no air gapped system practically exist anymore, not in SCADA or 
elsewhere. [2] 
 
Originally SCADA protocols were designed for reliable operation over small 
bandwidth connections. This operation over existing networks was one of main 
deciding factors for the protocol design and network security wasn’t practically 
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considered as a requirement at all. For example, one of the most popular 
protocols, MODBUS, has no encryption or authentication built in, only 16-bit or 
2 characters CRC/LRC check to validate the payload integrity and with the 
MODBUS TCP/IP implementation, even that is removed [12; 13]. Using clear 
text communications makes reverse-engineering the protocol and system 
operation much easier and it also reveals usernames and passwords used for 
authentication in the system. It is also not uncommon to use shared passwords for 
SCADA operators to make operating procedures smoother. This not only makes 
intrusion easier for attacker, but also eliminates the authentication and 
accountability of the legitimate users in the system. However, using encryption 
or strong authentication in the SCADA system isn’t always practical, and we’ll 
come to that later in the chapter 3. [2; 5; 17] 
 
SCADA systems have been and in many cases continue to be separated 
administratively from the business networks and other IT services of the 
companies operating these industrial control systems. Practically this means, that 
SCADA network is designed, operated, maintained and documented by industrial 
automation engineers, not by or even with the co-operation of the IT security 
experts dealing with the other business IT services. This practice also dates back 
to the history of the SCADA systems and to the times when they were 
proprietary and fully isolated systems. 
 
Historically, automation engineers have very little formal training or expertise in 
IT risk management or in best security practices of the IT infrastructure. With 
that, and as industrial control systems are fundamentally very different in their 
operation compared to regular IT systems, automation engineer’s approach 
towards risks is usually very different from that of IT security expert: Where data 
confidentiality and integrity are usually most important for typical corporate 
networks and services, for SCADA, fault tolerance, human and environmental 
safety and the process availability are the topmost concerns for the operation. For 
SCADA and other industrial control systems, reliability and real-time 
performance requirements are usually much higher compared to typical corporate 
network requirements. Down time and temporary lack of availability are often 
tolerated in corporate networks and services, and for example rebooting of 
hardware is completely normal maintenance procedure and temporary outages 
are quite acceptable. For Industrial Control Systems, high levels of redundancy 
and fault tolerance are usually required and all outages must be planned days or 
weeks in advance not endangering the safe performance of the process. [10; 17] 
 
This difference and clear separation between these two worlds pose a risk to the 
SCADA system as its security policies, training of the personnel, security 
architecture and both documented administrative and practical security 
procedures may all be inadequate for the control system concerning the cyber 
threat. Risk management and security policies suggested by the IT security 
personnel may even seem conflicting with the SCADA requirements and in some 
cases engineers operating the system may be unreceptive for IT staff 
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recommendations. At the same time, IT personnel may not fully understand the 
peculiarities sand operation of the control system. This can lead to the situation, 
where SCADA system is not only exposed to attacks, but also the engineers and 
technicians operating the system are totally unprepared for the threat and unable 
to react properly to a cyber security breach. [5] 
 
As SCADA systems consist of different hardware and software components, 
there is also always a possibility for flaws in those components. For example, 
from the beginning of the year 2014 till the end of July 2014, Open Source 
Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) has listed 94 publically exposed flaws in the 
SCADA equipment and related software [15]. In line with the problems 
described in the previous paragraph, platform vulnerabilities may also be caused 
by misconfigurations or poor maintenance of the SCADA applications, operating 
systems and other software. Also, SCADA system’s firewalls, intrusion detection 
systems, remote access practices, encryption, virus protection and password 
policies may be inadequate or misconfigured leaving the system exposed. [17] 
 
Listed above are some simplified and general vulnerabilities discussed in short. 
Real life systems may have some or all of these deficiencies and true risk 
analysis of a certain system of course goes in much more detail. It is important to 
notice, that the problem is not solely in technical aspects ranging from the lack of 
proper encryption in protocols to the poorly configured or non-existing firewalls. 
It is also in the different culture stemming from the perceived risks, priorities and 
requirements in the world of industrial control systems and, at the same time, 
perhaps the lack of understanding of the requirements from those who are 
working on IT staff or IT security and operating organization’s other networks 
and services. It is actually likely that the roots of the inadequate cyber resilience 
of SCADA lie actually there, in the lack of proper co-operation between 
industrial automation engineers and IT security experts. In many cases, expertise 
from both sides isn’t properly combined and thus adequately secure industrial 
control system isn’t created or managed. 
 
These differences in thinking may also be a challenge on a national scale. When 
governments are now rapidly creating resources and getting understanding of 
proper cyber defence measures, there may be a risk that SCADA and industrial 
control systems in general will have a similar fate here. It is true that Finland and 
many other developed nations have more or less defined critical infrastructure for 
themselves and cyber defence policies for critical industrial control systems 
should thus almost automatically apply here and cyber security of control 
systems will have attention that they deserve. What this would mean in practice, 
is government support in some form, like the use of expert red teams for 
evaluation, auditing and giving recommendations for critical ICS operators, but 
possibly even some form of regulation by the authorities. In Finland, quite an 
extensive regulation exists for telecommunications operators by Finnish 
Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA), operating directly under 
Ministry of Transport and Communications. FICORA sets the requirements for 
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public- and government networks and services concerning for example electric 
and physical protection, reliability, performance and security [1]. However, there 
is no such regulation for critical industrial networks or for organizations 
operating critical industrial control system networks [11]. 
 
3 Remediation and challenges 
 
In September 2002, after the initial turmoil of 9/11 in the United States, 
President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board and the United States 
Department of Energy Issued a document entitled “21 Steps to Improve Cyber 
Security of SCADA Networks”. It is a simple brochure type document listing few 
rules in just eight pages, but it is nonetheless easily approachable check list 
which helps to describe remediation for many of the problems listed in chapter 2. 
It is not complete by any means, but the list is still valid today more than 10 
years after its creation. There are several other similar and more in depth 
publications or literature which give recommendations for securing SCADA and 
ICS. One such example is “Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security” 
from 2008 by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which is 
recommended reading for anyone seeking more in-depth view towards ICS 
security, but still likes to have the information presented in a quite compact and 
simple form. 
 
Department of Energy’s document starts with the evaluation of all your 
connections, disabling unnecessary ones and using demilitarized zones (DMZ) to 
improve the security of data transfers between SCADA and other connected 
networks. After this, firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) should be 
implemented for different point of entries to the SCADA network. [28] 
 
As with the physical connections to other networks, all unnecessary or unused 
services or features, such as Internet access, email, remote meter reading, billing 
etc., should be turned off, especially when SCADA system is interconnected with 
other networks. Those services that are deemed necessary, should be allowed 
only after careful risk assessment and evaluation weighing benefits and risks. If 
some services are allowed to or from the outside the SCADA, such as vendor 
connections to some parts of the system, strong access control methods should be 
enforced. Here, co-operation with SCADA vendors is important to identify 
proper secure configurations. [28] 
 
Many SCADA devices also include built in security features, which should be 
used and system designers should never rely on proprietary protocols offering 
security. As said, Intrusion Detection Systems should be implemented, but for 
them to be effective, a 24-hour-a-day incident monitoring and response has to be 
established. As a part of monitoring, logging should be enabled where possible 
and a daily review of logs should be performed to find possible suspicious 
activity as early as possible. Technical audits for the network and devices will 
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help in locating vulnerabilities and “paths of least resistance” in the system that 
an attacker could exploit. [28] 
 
All aspects suggested in the paper are not fully technical and related to the 
SCADA system itself. Physical security, especially with remote sites, is also 
important. Areas like clearly defined requirements, policies and responsibilities, 
architecture documentation, configuration management processes, risk 
assessments and recovery plans are equally important for building and 
maintaining a secure SCADA system. “Red Teams”, which are groups of experts 
with understanding of the SCADA system and IT security, should be established 
to evaluate attack scenarios towards the system. [28] 
 
Figure 4. Graphical summary of 21 steps of SCADA cybersecurity. [9]  
 
As we can see, Department of Energy recommendations for SCADA are very 
similar compared to pretty much any other information system, and in that sense 
SCADA and other industrial control systems are very similar. However, 
especially from technical perspective, building a secure SCADA system with 
aforementioned recommendations, can easily get quite complicated and 
problematic.  
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Encrypted connections such as Virtual Private Networks (VPN) are one of those 
widely used techniques for creating reliable connections through untrusted 
networks and as such, they are a possibility for long distance communications 
with SCADA systems too. Specifications and hardware for different encryption 
solutions has been developed, but problem is that many widely used public or 
private key methods would cause too much latency for SCADA operation. Using 
SCADA protocols over IP adds as much as 30% overhead itself, so added 
encryption may be just too much. Also, field devices have limits of their own as 
they are designed to be low-power and reliable, but at the same time they lack the 
processing power to handle complex encryption or authentication schemes [10].  
In addition to that, industrial automation systems tend to have very long working 
life, for example 10-15 years. Therefore much of the existing equipment might 
not have any support for encryption and upgrading hundreds or thousands of 
devices to newer prematurely might prove very expensive. Remote sites use still 
lots of serial connections within the site and implementing IP-based VPN’s there 
isn’t possible at all, so building fully encrypted connections throughout the 
system is often very difficult. Furthermore, encrypted data traffic becomes 
essentially opaque to network monitoring and intrusion detection systems. 
Although encryption can eliminate some vulnerabilities, it should be 
implemented only after a careful evaluation of operational constraints and 
network monitoring policies. [30] 
 
We find similar problems easily with other security features. Firewalls, IDS 
systems and access control functions can also add to the latency of connections 
and configuring firewalls with large amount of connections and altering them 
according to a changing threat environment or system architecture can be a big 
task [9; 17]. Authentication poses another unique challenge for SCADA systems, 
as user’s ability to recall and enter a password may be impacted by the stress of 
the moment in an emergency situation. Some other methods such as dongles or 
other similar tokens provide other problems, as there is a possibility to lose the 
item. Again, authentication schemes may also add to the latency issues in the 
network requiring processing power and adding length to the messages. Protocols 
themselves may pose another challenge for authentication: while it would be 
possible to build proper authentication for operators and technicians, many of the 
widely used industrial protocols send passwords in clear text format and they 
don’t support any sort of device authentication [10; 17]. All these restrictions 
should be noted and different authentication methods should be carefully 
considered in the way that authentication is feasible, but usability of the system 
from operator stand point of view has to be maintained and the safety or 
availability of the process isn’t endangered in any situation.  
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4 Situation in Finland and the future 
 
Although description in the end of chapter 2 may give bleak picture about the 
cyber security situation of industrial control system, it is not the whole truth and 
in Finland there has been a lot of effort from both industry and government on 
SCADA and industrial control systems cyber security. The focus of FICORA’s 
cyber security services, mainly that of National Cyber Security Centre Finland, is 
in the security and reliability of public communication networks and services, 
which of course more or less indirectly improves also the cyber security of 
SCADA networks. However, FICORA also has an agreement with National 
Emergency Supply Agency, which tasks include the maintaining the security of 
supply stockpiles, guiding the national economy in emergency situations, 
promoting the readiness planning of companies and ensuring the functioning of 
the national technical infrastructures [20; 23].  
 
One example of the agreement’s results and joint effort is HAVARO system, 
which is effectively an intrusion detection system offered for supply critical 
companies in Finland. HAVARO has few shortcomings, such as it only 
supervises traffic on the edge of Internet and adjoining corporate network. This 
means practically that everything inside the corporate network is out of 
HAVARO’s reach and networked systems such as SCADA with perhaps of 
hundreds of connections are not well suited for HAVARO. It is still a step 
towards right direction and because of National Cyber Security Centre’s co-
operation with other CERT representatives throughout the world, HAVARO can 
utilize more current and larger database for threat detection than publically 
available commercial products. [18] 
 
Security Committee, a permanent and broad-based co-operation body for 
proactive preparedness working within Defense Ministry, accepted National 
Cyber Strategy Implementation Guide in 11.3.2014. It lists a total of 74 concrete 
proceedings to improve cyber security on national level. One of them is the use 
of HUOVI web portal, which will be developed towards a secure cyber 
information and situational awareness channel for supply critical companies and 
government. In the future, platform may be available for all businesses. [7] 
 
On the agenda are also the development of training, research and exercise 
programmes between the years 2014-2018. To support this, Finnish Information 
Security Cluster (FISC) aims to establish a national cyber laboratory. There is no 
timetable for FISC-laboratory in the implementation plan, but its functions 
include the empowering of the co-operation between cluster companies and 
different research institutions and, of course, the research of cyber security of 
different products and services. If and when this laboratory is established, it 
needs to have the capabilities to test SCADA and other industrial control systems 
too. As an example from abroad, Idaho National Laboratory in the United States 
runs National SCADA Test Bed Program. Program was founded by Department 
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of Energy to ensure a secure, reliable and efficient distribution of electric power. 
Practically it means that the program evaluates selected control systems and 
control system components to identify cyber vulnerabilities, provides training in 
workshops and works in collaboration with industry and standardizing 
organizations. All testing is planned and conducted in collaboration with the 
interested industry partner and may be performed in the laboratory environment 
or at the partner’s site. Scale of operation in Finland will be of course smaller, 
but similar approach is probably required. Research should be also made in 
collaboration with different academia in Finland, who already have expertise in 
cyber security and/or industrial control systems, something that has generally 
been practiced widely in Finland in many fields of research. Close co-operation 
and information exchange with foreign laboratories, like the one in Idaho, is 
essential to have the most current information on the subject. National and 
international co-operation and research programmes are also on the agenda of 
implementation guide. [7; 14] 
 
Industry has also worked on the industrial cyber and information security. The 
Finnish Energy Industries (Energiateollisuus Ry) is a sector organisation for the 
industrial and labour market policy of the energy sector. It represents companies 
that produce, acquire, transmit and sell electricity, district heat and district 
cooling and offer related services. One emphasis for the year 2013 were 
networked control systems, communications systems and cyber security and to 
promote the theme, a study concerning the cyber security of our networked 
control systems in the energy sector was made. Study included a web 
questionnaire for sector companies and specific interviews with different actors 
on the field, from device manufacturers to telecommunications operators and 
information security companies. All together 27 companies and government 
agencies took part in the study. Results were both positive and negative and 
many challenges cited in this paper are present in the control systems of our 
electric distribution and production systems. In summary, the total information 
security levels in the companies generally varied from satisfactory to good 
according to the study, but the variance in results was large. Because of the 
public availability of the study, precise analysis about the technical details or 
recommendations based on findings wasn’t possible, but problems existed in 
both legacy and more modern IP-based control systems. According to the study, 
very little 3rd party auditions and evaluation of systems is preformed throughout 
the industry. Also, non-technical aspects, such as proper background checking 
when hiring new employees, leaves room for improvement. [22] 
 
As a major recommendation in the study, energy and electric distribution 
companies should define a broad security policies with one specific area that 
concentrates on cyber and information security. It is natural to do this as a part 
with normal continuity planning and risk management so that cyber and 
information security is properly integrated with management, processes and 
reporting. Availability of the systems and recovery from the crisis situations 
should be in the focus, which is very similar to NIST recommendations. With 
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some of the distribution companies, work was done quite well in this aspect, but 
there is still room for improvement with all the participants. [17; 22] 
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Abstract 
Purpose 
 
Modern society is increasingly dependent on electric power. Without power, 
almost all functions of the society halt in a time frame from seconds to days. The 
aim of this research is to describe technical structure of the Finnish power grid 
and find vulnerabilities either for natural phenomenon or deliberate damaging of 
the system. Potential targets for physical or cyber attacks are recognized. 
 
This study is based on public sources available on literature or the Internet. 
Based on the study, it seems that the importance of the power grid is widely 
recognized even in the media. Power companies are minimizing risks, but there 
is still a lot to be done. 
1 Introduction 
 
Modern power system consists of power plants producing the electric power, 
nationwide power grid delivering the electricity and consumers using the power.  
Historically, producers and consumers of power were at first located close to 
each other, the power grid didn’t exist. Local power plants produced electricity to 
a city or factory nearby. [29] History of the Finnish power grid goes back almost 
a hundred years. Construction of the first modern high voltage line Rautarouva 
(Iron Lady) between Turku, Helsinki and Viipuri was started in 1925. 
Nationwide power grid is a basic infrastructure and a very long term investment. 
This becomes obvious with the fact that the Rautarouva line powered up in 1929 
is still partly operational (Figure 1). [22] Very few technical systems can reach a 
life cycle that long (except railways or Roman aqueducts). 
 
Electric power is a basic necessity for a modern society. Without power almost 
all other services and infrastructure cease to operate. Power failure causes an 
immediate stop of [17]: 
 
 most of public transportation (trains, metro, trams) 
 commerce (most shops, banks, ATM’s, petrol stations) 
 infrastructure (water, heating) 
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Some services might have capability to survive some hours or even some days 
[17]: 
 
 Vehicles will operate until fuel runs out 
 Food stocks will last some days without fridges and freezers 
 Communications (cell phones, Internet, IT) will partly be operational even 
some days on backup power 
 Emergency infrastructure (hospitals, emergency centres) will run on 
backup power until fuel runs out.  
 In winter, buildings without a backup heating system will be frozen in a 
matter of days 
 
As those figures above state, power is among the most critical infrastructures in 
our world today. Lack of power stops the whole society and has big and fast 
economic impacts. In 2003, a large blackout in north eastern USA and Canada 
affected 50 million people lasting two days. Estimated cost of the blackout was 
between 7 and 10 billion USD. [11]  
 
In chapter 2 of this paper, the technical structure of the Finnish power grid is 
described. Understanding the technical principles of the system is important to be 
able to evaluate possible vulnerabilities. Basic structure of the power system has 
been the same for almost a hundred years. In the near future we will see largest 
changes in the history of the grid because of renewable energy and globalisation. 
Future of the power system is described in Chapter 3. Due to the long history of 
power systems, operators are quite well aware of dangers related to natural 
phenomenon. Still, even nowadays, storms, tsunamis, flooding etc. can cause a 
lot of damage to the power system. On the other hand, deliberate attacks to 
power systems are a new threat. Natural and man made threats are studied in 
Chapter 4 of this paper for both present and future power systems. 
 
Figure 1. Rautarouva, 110 kV line in Riihimäki. Photograph: Heinäaro, Kimmo 
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2 Finnish Power System 
2.1 Technical Background 
 
Modern power system in any country can be divided into three main parts: 
 Power plants producing the electrical power. These can be far away 
from consumers. 
 Network connecting producers with consumers. This network 
consists of several layers serving different areas and distances.  
 Consumers of electricity. These could be anything from ordinary 
households to large manufacturing plants. 
 
Power can be produced from lots of different sources that are not described here.  
Main focus in this chapter is to describe the structure of the network between 
producers and consumers. Understanding the technical principles of the network 
is important when considering possible vulnerabilities. 
 
The fundamental starting point of developing a power system is Ohm’s law: 
  
I = V/R, 
 
where I=Current, V=Voltage, R=Resistance 
 
Another important thing to remember is the electric power equation: 
 
P = UI, 
 
where P=Power, U=Voltage, I=Current 
 
All materials used in the wiring of a power network have resistance (except 
superconductors) that causes energy losses according to Ohm’s law and the 
power equation. Part of the energy transferred will warm up the wire. When 
transferring lots of power from a power plant over long distances to consumers, 
these thermal losses are significant. In addition to costs, too much thermal loss 
will eventually melt the wire. To reduce losses, high voltages and thick wiring 
(less resistance) are used for long distances. High voltage means long safety 
distances, for example higher pylons supporting the wires. Thick wiring means 
more material costs for wiring. End result when planning a transmission line is 
always a compromise between losses and costs. [9] Superconductors don’t have 
resistance and hence no thermal losses, but the core of the cable must be cooled 
down near absolute zero temperature with e.g. liquid nitrogen. Superconductors 
can transfer higher power levels than a copper wire equal size, but some of the 
power is lost for cooling the cable (Figure 2). [10] 
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Figure 2. Superconducting power line (60 kV, 1000 A) in Deutches Museum. 
Photograph: Heinäaro, Kimmo 
 
For the technical reasons described above, power network is hierarchical (Figure 
3). For long distances high voltage lines are used. High voltage is transformed to 
a smaller voltage in a power substation serving a certain area. This is further 
reduced in several stages when approaching the consumer and finally the 
household voltage of 400 / 230 V in Europe. [4] 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Principle of Finnish Power System 
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For easy voltage conversion through all the voltage levels of the transmission 
network, AC (Alternating Current) is used. DC (Direct Current) is used mainly 
for extra long distances or international transfer of power. AC requires 
synchronizing all producers of electricity to the frequency and phase of the 
network (50 Hz in Europe, 60 Hz in USA). There is no storage of power in the 
network (except kinetic energy stored in generators); production and 
consumption must be in balance at all times. If production is larger than 
consumption, the frequency of the network will start rising (generators in power 
plants will rotate faster). If consumption is larger than production, frequency will 
fall. Production and transmission of power requires constant monitoring and 
tuning to keep it in balance. Some types of power plants can be adjusted rapidly 
(e.g. hydroelectric power). Some are slower to adjust (e.g. nuclear power plants). 
For instant adjustment of power produced there are spinning reserves (running, 
but on partial production power) in the network. For peak load situations there 
are standing reserve units ready to be started. There are also predefined consumer 
loads that can be disconnected if necessary. Maintaining reserve units is 
expensive and the fuel they use is more costly (e.g. diesel). Electricity produced 
with reserve units is more expensive compared to other means. For this reason, 
power companies will try to minimize the need for standing reserve units and 
their use. [1] 
 
For adjusting the power production, there must be controlling station(s) in the 
network. Controlling station is constantly aware of consumption and forecast of 
consumption days ahead. It controls production, import, export and routing of 
power in the transmission lines. To achieve this, real time information of all parts 
of the network and remote control of devices and plants is needed. Management 
station uses industrial control systems to monitor and control the network 
(SCADA, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition). [6] 
 
Power systems nowadays are no longer national only. Electric power is 
constantly crossing borders of countries. All national operators will buy the 
power needed at any moment from the most economical source, either domestic 
or foreign produced. This must of course happen within limits of power line 
transmission capacity. Transmission of power across borders can be DC to 
separate networks of neighbouring countries or it can be AC when networks are 
synchronized together. 24 countries in continental Europe are connected together 
to form the largest synchronous grid in the world (Continental Synchronous 
Area). [4] 
 
2.2 Finnish Power System in Practice 
 
Main sources of electricity in Finland are nuclear power (27%), hydroelectric 
power (15%) and biomass (13%) according to 2013 statistics. Import of power 
was 19 % of total consumption in 2013. Finnish specialty in production of energy 
is Combined Heat and Power (CHP). In cold Finnish climate it is economically 
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reasonable to combine production of both heat and electric power from the same 
fuel in the same plant. Waste heat from production of electricity is used for 
district heating. Accommodation of almost half the population is heated by 
district heating and about 80% of production of district heating is combined with 
generation of electricity. CHP production is economical and emissions are lower 
compared to separate production of heat and power. This is achieved with the 
high efficiency of CHP plants, which might be up to 90% compared to 45 % of 
ordinary power plants. Load following hydroelectric power plants are the main 
spinning reserve in Finland to adjust for variations in the consumption of power. 
Other means for spinning reserves are import of power and CHP plants. [5] Fast 
standing reserve units include diesel and gas turbine plants. Slow reserves 
include plants powered by coal, oil or peat.  There are also contracts with heavy 
industry (wood, chemical, metal) to disconnect some loads in case of need to 
stabilize the network. [4]  
 
The Finnish power network consists of the main grid, regional networks and 
local distribution networks. Main grid is operated by Fingrid Oyj, established in 
1996. Main shareholder of Fingrid is Republic of Finland (55% of votes). Fingrid 
is responsible not only for the national main grid, but also international 
connections. Finnish main grid is part of the synchronized inter-Nordic network 
of Northern Europe (eastern Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden). 
Additionally, there are DC connections to Estonia, Sweden and Russia. Finnish 
main grid is not part of the European Continental Synchronous Area, but there 
are DC links between inter-Nordic network and the continental network (Figure 
4). [4] 
 
Figure 4. Inter-Nordic transmission grid [4] 
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The main grid in Finland consists (Figure 5) of [4]: 
 
 4500 km of 400 kV lines 
 2300 km of 220 kV lines 
 7500 km of 110 kV lines 
 113 electric substations. 
 
 
Figure 5. Finnish Main Power Grid operated by Fingrid [4] 
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The Finnish (and Nordic) power system is planned using the N-1 security 
criteria. This criteria means that any single fault, like disconnecting any 
producing unit (even the largest 1200 MW nuclear power plant) or any 
transmission line from the grid shall not produce any large impact in the network. 
Only local disturbances are allowed. After 15 minutes, the grid shall withstand 
another N-1 fault. In Finland, largest single fault would be 865 MW (power of 
one unit in Olkiluoto nuclear power plant). This will increase significantly after 
powering up the third unit in Olkiluoto (1600 MW). [1] The main grid in Finland 
is a looped (mesh) network to achieve backup routes. Loops exist also in regional 
networks, but backup routes are only connected when necessary. Also 
distribution networks are looped in towns, but in rural areas networks are 
normally radial, there are no backup routes, for economic reasons.  [9]  
 
Frequency of the network should remain within 49.9 - 50.1 Hz (Nordic Grid 
Code). This is normally achieved with frequency controlled spinning reserves. 
When frequency of the network falls below 49.9 Hz, fast reserves are 
automatically deployed. Slow reserves are manually started in 15 minutes to 
release fast reserves for the next use. Goal is to keep frequency over 49.5 Hz 
even when a large power plant is suddenly disconnected from the grid.  [12] 
 
3 Future of Electric Power Systems 
 
Technical structure of power systems has remained static for almost a hundred 
years. In the near future, however, there will be major modifications in the whole 
infrastructure. Of course, Ohm’s law and Euros spent will still dictate the 
framework to work within. These are some new trends that will affect the power 
infrastructure: 
 
 Smart grid 
 Renewable energy 
 Globalisation of power systems 
 Distributed generation of power 
 Electric vehicles. 
 
3.1 Smart Grid 
 
Smart grid is a modern version of the power grid. Exactly the same wires for 
transporting energy can be used in a smart grid than in a traditional grid. The 
“smart” grid is created with the aid of Information and Communications 
Technology. Old manually operated and mechanical components (kWh meters, 
switches, circuit breakers etc.) of the grid are changed to remote readable and 
controllable units. Key issue in a smart grid is two way communications between 
components. Another important element is the “smart meter”. Old on-site 
readable meters are replaced by smart meters that can communicate with the 
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network manager (Figure 6). A smart grid also has sensors to measure voltage, 
phase, stability etc. in multiple locations of the network. These sensors can for 
example provide real time information to network management, reduce effects of 
faults, automatically isolate faulty circuits and make more efficient use of the 
network.  [5] 
 
Smart meters can enable variable pricing of power. Goal is to cut peak 
consumption that is produced in reserve power plants with costly fuel. 
Disconnecting secondary loads could even be done automatically through the 
smart meter. It is also possible to use smart meters two ways: to buy power from 
the grid or to sell power to the grid. It is possible to collect e.g. solar power 
locally and feed surplus to the national grid. [5] 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Smart meter, Photograph: Heinäaro, Kimmo 
 
3.2 Renewable Energy 
 
In order to reduce emissions from fossil fuel and reduce dependence on foreign 
energy, EU has a target to produce 20 % of energy from renewable sources by 
2020 [3]. Another boost to renewable energy in Europe is decision of German 
government to close all nuclear power plants by 2022 [28].  
 
Renewable energy has been used in power production for a long time. Traditional 
renewable sources of energy are hydroelectric power and biomass. New growing 
areas for emission free power are solar and wind energy. These are typically 
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produced in large farms connected to the power grid. These energy forms 
however have one major drawback: the production is not continuous. Sun isn’t 
always shining or the wind may calm down. Connection to the power grid must 
be made according to the peak power of the farm, although the average power is 
far from it. To compensate variations in production, there must be enough power 
reserves available in the grid. 
 
3.3 Power System Globalization 
 
There is a trend to further interconnect national grids together both physically 
and economically. In EU goal is to achieve European market for power by the 
end of 2014. European market aims to lower costs, increase reliability and reduce 
need for expensive reserve power. [4] 
 
A very large grid can compensate differences in renewable energy production: it 
is probably always windy somewhere in Europe. When stretched over several 
time zones, the peak consumption hours in one zone can be covered by excess 
power from another. There are some projects that aim to produce large quantities 
of solar power in Sahara and export it to Europe with high voltage DC 
connections or even superconductors [2; 16; 23]. 
  
In USA, the national power grid is divided to four separate synchronous areas: 
Eastern Interconnect, Western Interconnect, Texas Interconnect and Quebec 
Interconnect. [11] Project Tres Amigas plans to connect three of these grids 
together in New Mexico. The superstation planned will use superconducting 
cables and high voltage DC between areas. [10] 
 
3.4 Distributed Generation of Power 
 
Distributed Energy Resource (DER) means producing power locally in small 
scale. This could mean a few photovoltaic cells in a household, or larger farms. 
These systems can be used for local use only or they could be connected to the 
national power grid (Feed-in Tariff, FIT) [18]. Distributed production has 
potential to become the biggest change in power system infrastructure in its 
hundred years of history. In several countries cost of solar power (calculated over 
the full lifetime of the equipment) compared to retail cost of power has reached 
equality. This point of equal costs is called ‘grid parity’. Below grid parity, 
consumers will get cost reductions by installing their own power production. 
This could eventually lead to massive distributed production of power. 
Distributed energy production is even compared to replacing wired phones with 
mobile phones. Power companies might become producers of backup power 
only, for night time and cloudy days. Net flow of power to a large number of 
consumers would be zero or even negative. [13] 
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3.5 Electric Vehicles 
 
Number of electric cars will undoubtedly increase fast in the near future. 
Charging of electric cars will require a whole new infrastructure based on power 
grids, not tank trucks. Electric cars can be charged slowly over several hours 
from an ordinary wall socket. This is however not always possible, also fast 
charging stations are needed.  Fast charging means high voltage DC of 50 kW’s 
or more. With this amount of power, it is possible to load the battery for 
additional 100 km in less than 30 minutes. A charging station with several 
charging sockets will need a lot of power during peak hours of the day. [15]  
 
According to calculations done, even large numbers of electric cars should have 
no affect on the main power grid, but local delivery networks might get 
congested. Smart grids should be deployed to reduce peak power, not to charge 
large number of electric cars at exactly the same time after working hours. [14]  
 
4 Threats and Risk Mitigation in a Power System 
 
Natural phenomenon or deliberate damaging can affect any part of a power 
system. Possible threats to power producing plants, power transmission network 
and the network management system are described in this chapter. Threats to 
consumers of power are not studied in detail. Consumers should however be 
aware and prepare for a possible blackout in the power grid. For Finnish 
households there exists a guidebook from the Finnish Ministry of Defence giving 
advice how to survive a long lasting blackout [17]. Companies should also make 
calculations of risks and costs involved. Backup power is easily available as UPS 
devices or generator systems. In all preparations for producers, network operators 
or consumers, it is necessary to calculate costs of problems and costs of 
preparations. It is economically impossible to prepare for everything, but it might 
be economically wise to invest for some level of backup in the most critical 
components. For example, a household might have just enough backup power for 
the pump of central heating system to keep the house warm burning logs. For 
companies, data or a web shop might be the most valuable asset to keep intact 
using geographical decentralization.  
 
4.1 Threats to Power Plants 
 
Power plants are of course critical components in a power system. Disconnecting 
a single power plant (even the largest nuclear plant) from the grid, however, 
shouldn’t even be visible to consumers. There are power reserves available, both 
domestic and imported. Threats to power plants include natural phenomenon: 
storms, tsunamis, flooding, earthquakes, volcanoes etc. and human actions: user 
error, terrorism, cyber attacks.  
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Large plants are fairly easy to protect cost effectively against all imaginable 
threats. Problem is that all possible threats cannot be imagined. In Fukushima, 
the nuclear plant survived an earthquake and loss of connection to the grid, but 
failed when a tsunami wave destroyed the backup generators. Combination of 
three simultaneous problems was not predicted. [20] In Chernobyl, a user 
bypassing security systems added with severe design faults in the plant caused 
the accident [7]. 
 
Large plants are heavily guarded making them hard targets for terrorists. In 
Finland, nuclear power plants are protected with for example vehicle barriers, 
electric fences and armed guards [31]. On the other hand, small plants might be 
unmanned, but their importance to the grid is negligible. 
 
Cyber attacks are a new threat to power plants as well as other networked 
systems. Aurora Generator Test done in 2007 at Idaho National Labs 
demonstrated that it is possible to actually physically destroy a big diesel 
generator by a cyber attack. Attack was used to control a circuit breaker between 
the generator and the power grid. By opening and closing a circuit breaker 
without synchronizing the generator to the grid, caused mechanical overload and 
destruction of the generator. [24] Protecting a power plant from cyber threats is 
similar to protecting any other industrial facility. Cyber threats to power 
infrastructure are further studied in chapter 4.3 of this paper.  
 
4.2 Threats to Power Grid 
 
According to chapter 2.2, there are 14000 kilometres of high voltage lines in the 
Finnish main grid. In addition to the main grid, there are lots of regional and 
distribution lines. It is obviously impossible to guard every pylon of these lines.  
Deliberate attacks against the wiring however aren’t very effective. The main 
grid is a mesh network: damaging one line doesn’t affect delivery of power. Even 
if some local delivery networks aren’t looped, damaging them only causes local 
problems and can be quite quickly repaired.  
 
Main threats to the wiring of the grid are caused by natural phenomenon. The 
main grid in Finland should be protected from trees falling by maintaining a 
treeless corridor around the lines. Still, sometimes trees are falling even on the 
main grid [4] Lower voltage lines are not so well protected. They can be affected 
by falling trees, storms, heavy snow or lightning. Accidental man made threats 
include excavators cutting underground cables or loggers cutting trees over 
power lines. Storms can cause large scale destruction and blackouts that can take 
several days to repair. A new law was passed in Finland in 2001, after two storms 
caused blackouts (lasting up to a week) for 800000 customers. It mandates power 
companies to compensate customers in blackouts lasting more than 12 hours. The 
goal is to make power companies invest in faster recovery times. [27]  
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Best way to prepare for both natural and man made threats for wiring is to use 
underground cables instead of overhead wires. Storms, falling trees, lightning or 
snow won’t affect cables hidden underground. Underground cables cost more, 
but are a useful alternative when replacing old distribution or even regional 
networks. Using cables for main grid however is challenging because of much 
higher costs and electrical qualities of cables (higher reactive power compared to 
overhead wires). [4] 
 
Critical points for man made damage in a power system are the junction points of 
the network: power substations. They convert voltage levels and / or route power 
between transmission lines. Substation typically contains large transformers and 
a switchyard (Figure 8). It is normally unmanned and remote controlled. 
Transformers used in the substations are big, heavy and expensive. Delivery time 
for replacing such transformers could be months and power companies are 
reluctant to invest in spare units. [11] Natural phenomenon threatening 
substations are for example storms, flooding and lightning. Man made threats 
include user errors, terrorist attacks and cyber attacks. In California it was 
reported that a group of snipers using AK-47 assault rifles destroyed 17 large 
transformers in Metcalf power station causing damage worth millions of dollars. 
Attack took only 19 minutes and snipers disappeared before the police arrived. 
[19] 
 
Substations are very easy to locate, they are large and quite visible. It is also easy 
to find them from online services. In Figures 7-9, the address of a random 
substation was checked from Fingrid online map service. Based on the address, 
photograph and satellite image of the station were fetched from Google Maps. It 
is difficult to protect the substations from deliberate physical attacks; it would be 
very costly to guard them all the time. At the moment there is no obligation for 
power companies to stock spare transformers either. [30] When calculating risks 
and costs involved in key components of the network, power companies and 
government have somewhat different equations. For example, keeping spare 
transformers in stock is a big investment for a power company, spares are 
probably never needed and biggest financial threat is compensation to customers. 
For a society, cost of a transformer is negligible compared to costs of a large long 
term blackout.  
 
4.3 Threats to Network Management 
 
A power system needs constant adjustment of production level and routing in the 
grid. This requires a Network Management system using industrial control 
(SCADA) to monitor and control all parts of the network. Also, all trends of 
future power systems described in chapter 3 have one thing in common: more 
communications and smart remotely controlled components are required. 
Communications is ever increasing in power systems, but these SCADA systems 
are vulnerable to several threats. Natural phenomenon like storm and lightning 
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can cut communications or destroy remote devices. Man made threats include 
user errors, terrorist and cyber attacks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Map location of a power substation. Screenshot: Fingrid Map Service 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Photograph of a power substation. Screenshot: Google Streetview 
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Figure 9. Satellite view of a power substation. Screenshot: Google Maps 
 
Large power plants are in theory relatively easy to protect against cyber attacks, 
because they are manned and contained in a single geographical area. Possibly 
the whole industrial network of the plant is inside a secure area. Normal 
precautions apply: air gapped (physically isolated) production network, defence 
in depth, firewalls, IDS and IPS systems and good security policy. Despite all the 
precautions above, these systems aren’t totally safe. Malware called Stuxnet 
successfully targeted an air gapped industrial control system in Iran through an 
infected usb memory in 2010. Such tailored attacks with detailed inside 
knowledge of the plant cannot be prevented with ordinary measures. [25] 
 
Opposite to power plants, components of the power grid are geographically 
distributed all over the country. All remotely controlled sub stations and other 
devices need some communication channel. Lots of these components are located 
in unguarded locations in possibly far away sites. According to a survey among 
Finnish power companies in 2013, there are currently several possible 
vulnerabilities in the SCADA power networks. About 60% of companies 
surveyed allow remote connections to power control systems from a vendor 
network or even home computers of employees. 60% of companies interviewed 
don’t use encryption when communicating with remote controlled stations. On 
the other hand, 75% of companies are planning to improve their SCADA systems 
in near future. [21] In 2014, over thousand energy companies in 84 countries 
were found to be infected by malware called Dragonfly or Energetic Bear. 
Software was designed to spy target systems and had capability to grant control 
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of the SCADA system to the attacker. The malware was delivered with updates 
to SCADA software. [26] 
 
SCADA of power systems is problematic regarding cyber attacks because the 
systems are very heterogeneous: there are devices from a long time period, there 
are lots of protocols used, geographical distribution is at least nationwide and lots 
of companies are involved. Smart grid brings a new set of challenges by 
combining all these together. Making them interoperable is a challenge on its 
own and adding cyber security to the whole system is costly. To protect systems 
from advanced attacks, security must be considered at all levels, there is no 
single device or box that keeps the attackers outside. [8] 
 
Some countermeasures to protect power systems from cyber attacks are (in 
addition to traditional firewalls and virus scanners) [8]: 
 
 Defence in depth. Multiple layers of security should be used. This 
might be challenging in the extremely heterogeneous power grids. 
 All communications should be encrypted. This can be a challenge with 
embedded remote controlled devices demanding low latency 
communications and with limited processing power. At least 
whitelisting (checking running processes to be legitimate) should be 
used. 
 Situational awareness. Abnormal actions in the network should be 
detected through advanced network monitoring. This can be achieved 
automatically by checking logs and events. 
 The whole supply chain of both hardware and software should be 
checked. It is possible to get embedded malware or backdoor directly 
from a vendor. The vendor could be compromised or even malicious 
itself. 
 Smart grid standards for security should be followed; in USA: NISTIR 
7628 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security, in Europe: M/490 
Smart Grid Mandate 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Electric power is widely recognized as a critical infrastructure of a modern 
society. During the whole history of power systems, there have been attempts to 
protect the infrastructure from natural elements. But even recently, nature has 
shown its power. Natural disasters like storms or tsunamis can destroy our power 
infrastructure in large scale. Man made attacks, both physical terrorist and virtual 
cyber attacks are a relatively new phenomenon. Protecting the vast power grid 
from physical attacks it was never designed for, is a challenge both technically 
and economically. At least key components of the network should be recognized, 
protected and precautions should be made in case of their destruction. Cyber 
attacks in a very complex and rapidly developing industrial network of power 
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systems are another challenge. Security should be considered at all levels from 
hardware components to applications. On the other hand, in a power consumer 
perspective, distributed generation seems a promising way to reduce risks of 
power failures and eventually even reduce costs of energy.  
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Abstract  
 
Cyber operations are developing rapidly among the armies. The need of 
consistent and comprehensive Common Operational Picture (COP) is a 
fundamental need in performing the operations, but the implementation such is 
not straightforward. Situational Awareness of cyber environment proposes 
multiple challenges to the automation as well as the personnel using the 
information. The challenges lie in possibilities of gaining the needed information 
from physical systems as well as from the network itself. From the critical 
infrastructure point of view the challenges exists in the entire society. The actor 
making decision, based on national cyber situation awareness, needs the 
information from multiple sources, including industry entities, in an easily 
understandable form.  
 
The concept of Common Cyber Picture (CCP) is created by combining several 
information sources using information integration and fusion. The environment is 
multisensory; the information can be e.g. from information networks, industrial 
automation systems, physical sensors as well as from electric systems. CCP 
includes only high level information because it is a tool for high level 
observation and decision making. If the need for accessing the detailed raw data 
exists, it will be collected using on demand service provides by the sources. In 
another words, the system needs to be scalable. The displayed information is to 
be arranged into a layers which can be filtered based on geographical locations, 
logical system views and according to industry branch (e.g. all the water supplier 
companies). In the advanced applications the CCP system is capable to support 
threat analysis and visualize the results.  
 
The desirable result of the integration and visualization of the CCP answers at 
least to the questions; “What is happening in critical infrastructure” and “what is 
the state of our capabilities”. Based on the derived information it is possible to 
make decisions and expand the scope from situational awareness into a decision 
making system.  
 
92 
This research presents the Situational Awareness of Critical infrastructure and 
Networks (SACIN) framework for gathering the information from the entities, 
means for information fusion of such information, and finally presents the initial 
version of user interface.  
Keywords  
Cyber, Situational Awareness, Decision making, Cyber Common Operational 
Picture 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Understanding the status of the network and connected devices is not an easy 
task, especially if the need for national or global situational awareness is taken 
into consideration. The concept of critical infrastructure broadens the scope by 
introducing the end product deliverables, such as electricity or water, into to the 
theatre. The traditional way of understanding the cyber usually focuses on 
networking devices and tools. This approach is not wide enough from the 
perspective of national common cyber picture, which aims to provide an up-to-
date picture of critical infrastructures which are heavily bounded to networks.   
 
The perspective of different entities changes the approach to Situational 
Awareness (SA) applications and especially command systems. The military, 
government and industry have different approaches to situational awareness of 
systems. One thing that is common to all, is the need for secure their own 
processes; in industry level this means unstopped business, but in government 
level it is the continuous operation of society.  The Common Operational Picture 
(COP) alone does not present a durable solution for the society’s needs. 
Command and Control (C2) is needed in order to effect to the situation. When C2 
and COP are combined in cyber environment the system becomes a tool for 
decision making which is the desired endpoint.  
 
Definition of Common Operational Picture 
 
A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one 
command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative planning and 
assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called COP. [1] 
 
Definition of Command and Control 
 
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over 
assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command 
and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, 
equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a 
commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and 
operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. [2] 
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Critical infrastructure   
 
is a term used by governments todescribe assets that are essential for the function
ing of a society and economy. [3] 
 
The research questions for the research are: 
 
  Is it possible to create a combined national cyber Common Operational 
Picture? 
 With what kind of high level architecture can be created to support 
national CCP? 
 Is it possible to present Common Cyber Picture in a feasible 
manner? 
 
This study mainly focuses on the first sub question and presents one solution 
based on multiple layers of services which are able to create and share the 
information. Moreover, the focus is in planning architecture, which is able to 
support dynamic adjustment of data amount. The idea is not to use so called Big 
Data solutions, but to limit the information to status information and create an 
on-request link for the components for more accurate information. The 
fundamental component of Situational Awareness of Critical infrastructure and 
Networks (SACIN) is built on top of services and it is in fact the service itself. 
Even the approach has influences from Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), it 
is not bound to SOA ideology. The SACIN system is planned as a reusable 
component for different levels. Different instances are able to access and 
discover the services provided by others and increase the abstraction level. In 
many cases the systems are created as an endpoint for all information. That is not 
the case in SACIN; the idea is to expand the information gathered to the services 
in the next levels.  
 
The planned system focuses on answering the question “What is happening in 
critical infrastructure?” The answer could have the perspective of a specific 
industry branch, similar systems (components), national infrastructure, etc.   
 
The limitations for this study include the risk of attack towards the created 
system and user access management of the created services. It is recognized that 
solutions for improving the reliability exists such as in [4], but it is not the key 
area of research. The study focuses on investigating a concept, not to deliver a 
product.  
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2 Overall description 
 
The information levels used be the system varies from data to information. The 
SACIN presents a framework, which is able to transfer the simplified 
information from sensor to the integration service. The framework supports 
information from multiple different sensors and also presents the user interface 
for operation center as well as simplified interface for browser users. The 
framework implements Joint Directories of Laboratories (JDL) model from 
levels 0 to 2 and also creates a platform for 4 and 5. The implementation of JDL 
model to cyberspace has been studied in [5; 6]. Complex event processing (CEP) 
framework is able to provide improvement capabilities to JDL model and 
improve accuracy [7]. Figure 1 below presents the JDL model adopted with the 
CEP component.  
 
Figure 1. – JDL and CEP adapted from [7-9] 
 
The framework uses client-server connections from the sensor entities to the 
SACIN services. The SACIN includes multiple services which the passive 
services are able to discover and start sharing. The active services can be for 
example an external database containing the information which is accessed 
through web service. In the figure 2 the overall description is presented.  
 
The process of information delivery is based on service discovery from which the 
connecting services are able to find the services provided by the SACIN. 
Moreover, the entities using the services (Operation center & Mobile application) 
are able to detect the information source. The framework hosts two different 
types of information in terms of gathering method; active or passive. Active 
methods include operations from the SACIN framework, such as invoking a 
service which will deliver service availability information. These active services 
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will publish a description to the service discovery component from which it is 
possible to automatically start using new services. Passive methods from the 
SACIN point of view includes services such as intrusion detection systems 
(IDS), which will provide the information when something happens or it is 
needed. This is enabled by providing a service which the individual components 
can discover and start sharing.  
 
The framework is built to support the combinations of multiple SACIN instances 
for sharing the information. One possible use case would be to build and 
independent SACIN for water delivery and independent SACIN for electricity 
systems. These two components contain the sources for their own needs and then 
publish the result as a service using service discovery. When the national wide 
component is starting to combine the information it will use the provided 
services and create a higher level presentation of the situation. This framework is 
presented in figure 3. Any SACIN system can consist of multiple lower level 
implementations where operators are focusing on specific problems (such as IDS 
detections) and then contribute to the next level of abstraction. 
 
 
Figure 2. Overall system 
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3 Information sources  
 
A precondition for system supporting situational awareness is the accessibility of 
source information. In this case there are two types of information in terms of 
collection method; active or passive. The fundamental difference is that active 
entities use on-demand services when passive systems enable push type of 
operation (see figure 2).  
2.1 Active methods 
 
Active methods are services provided by an independent entity, which is able to 
publish the services and perform specific tasks which require larger amount of 
CPU power when compared to passive services. These services can be tailored 
solutions inside corporate network or external services open to everyone. In 
figure 4 the basic architecture is presented. In fact, the SACIN can be an active 
service itself as described in earlier paragraphs.  
 
 
Figure 3. Relations 
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Figure 4. Active services 
 
An example of an external system requiring relatively lots of power would be an 
environmet tailored to scan industrial automation systems vulnerabilities 
constanly. This component can publish the results of the constant scan when it is 
requested by SACIN. A component for this purpouse is partially presented in 
[10].  Recognized active services are presented in table 1 below.  
 
Active services   
Service Purpouse Estimated update 
frequency 
Service 
availability 
Detect if a selected service is 
running and accessible 
1 minute – 60 minutes 
Route discovery Detect if multiple important 
routes are in use 
1 minute – 60 minutes 
Open source 
Systems 
 
Honeybot detection, 
incidents, virus detections 
Less than minute 
Vulnerability 
scan 
Detect vulnerable systems in 
public networks 
1 minute – 60 minutes 
Vulnerability 
Analysis  
Estimate risk of a specifi 
event 
30-300 minutes 
Table 1. Active methods 
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2.2 Passive methods 
 
Passive methods create the backbone of the SACIN by producing the largest part 
of the information. The amount of these sensor can be large (e.g. 10 000 and 
more) depending the entity being tracked. Passive services deliver the 
information when an incident has happened. The figure 5 presents the 
architecture of the services. The main difference between the active services is 
the way of publishing. The SACIN publishes the services, which can be used by 
the passive services (see also figure 2).  This enables the use of extremely light 
weight solutions without any server running in the passive device. At the same 
time all the clients are able to reconfigure automatically if SACIN changes the 
way or place where it publishes services. The passive service also has means to 
deliver more accurate information to SACIN on request. The information can be 
for example log files from specific time frame or service functionality history 
information.  
 
A central component in passive services is the stand alone component, called the 
agent, created to fit in the needs of industrial automation management system or 
just for on-off type of sensor. This component can be installed to a generic 
framework and it will use interface to receive information from the system. The 
most simplified information which is delivered is the red-green-blue presentation 
of the state of the system. The agent also implements the gateway and dictionary 
for transferring log files. The agent can also store the history information in 
several ways for later use.  The final solution could take advantage on peer-to-
peer (P2P) solution, which enables the probes to connect to each other and 
deliver the information using a network of agents.  
 
As presented in the figure 5 the SACIN consist of services which can be 
published throught the service discovery to all the entities.  Table 2 presents the 
possbile components providing the information.  
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Figure 5. Passive services  
 
Passive 
services  
 
Service Purpouse Estimated update 
frequency 
Intrusion 
Detection 
System (IDS) 
Detect harmfull traffic from 
network traffic and inform  
On incident 
Intrusion 
Protection 
System (IPS) 
Detect harmfull traffic from 
network traffic and inform and also 
react on detected traffic 
On incident 
Firewall Report intrusion or scan attempts  On incident 
Honeypot Report detected malicious activity 
inside honeybot 
On incident 
Agent  Attach to the component or system 
being supervised and report status 
and provide on-request data 
On incident 
 
Table 2. Passive methods 
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3 Agent 
 
The purpose for the agent is to provide the needed information for SACIN. The 
point where the agent will be deployed is a management component in an 
industrial automation system or similar. The agent is not designed to be deployed 
in a low level device, such as IDS, but to the component controlling a group of 
devices.  
 
The figure 6 describes the agent attachment to the target system. All the black 
boxes are entities where SACIN does not have visibility or control. As can be 
seen from the picture an important part is the plugin component, which in fact 
provides information from the target system. This component will be built by a 
domain expert and it will take care of gaining and calculating system status (e.g. 
Red-Green-Yellow) and providing log files based on dictionary created by the 
domain expert, which is bound to the specific generic dictionary advertised by 
SACIN. The only information which is delivered automatically is the status 
information. Log files are available only on request and maintained in the agent 
database for later use.   
 
 
Figure 6. Agent 
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The agent is capable to deliver four types of information to the SACIN; status 
information (red, yellow, green), log information from status, log information 
based on known dictionary and raw log data from the system. The time used in 
the delivered log files can contain the original time stamp, but it is also bound to 
a time synchronized from a Network Time Protocol (NTP) server. The log 
sources are divided to three different classes as presented in figure 7.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Log classification 
3.1 View 
 
The first level of information used by the system is presented in three states; 
operational (green), disturbance detected (yellow) and not operational (red). The 
relations between different entities can be taken into account by presenting a 
relation link with colour using similar codes as presented earlier. This relation 
can be saved in the definition of service and presented to the user using filter for 
the purpose. The simplified symbols are presented in figure 8.  
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Figure 8. Status symbols 
 
Based on these extremely simple symbols it is possible to create the first level 
presentation using filtering of the objects. These custom views are created by a 
human operator. When an analysis is applied it can be shared for the use of the 
new abstraction level. In the figure 9 the targets in water delivery are filtered and 
presented in a logical view from a specific area. The selected area presents at 
least the unit name, provides level 1 history (status history), type and update 
time.  
 
 
Figure 9. View  
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The field of visualization of cyber targets is in constant change and it has a great 
need of further research. The concept of multimodal user interface [11] could 
offer improved capabilities also in cyberspace operations. Wei et al. [12] present 
a visualization technique based on discrete wavelet transform (DWT), which 
could offer an usable non-traditional way of interpreting cyber events.   The user 
interface should be able to provide a simple and easy view for human, but this is 
all but trivial task to the designer. Blasch [13] lists the main challenges in human 
perception as follows.  
 
Limitations of human attention which the automation designer must 
keep in mind include: 
• Perceptual Processing Limitations – Increased perceived 
difficulty attending to more things at one time. 
• Focus of Attention - Impact of the situation on the user in 
directing the attention and keeping it focused. 
• Central Processing Limitations – Cognitive processes may be 
limited in number which can occur at a time. 
• Memory – Long, Working, Short - relationship between 
attention, working memory, search, short-term retention. 
• Modes of Attention - Top-down or Bottom-up [13] 
 
Often the systems for cyberspace are focused on incident detection and handling. 
In terms of critical infrastructure visualization, it can be considered also in terms 
of situation visualization, which contains incidents, but also the capabilities 
operating normally. The proposed agent infrastructure is built for the latter 
purpose.  
Figure 10. Decision making architechture 
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4 Decision making 
 
Why would a system offering a common operational picture would be created? 
As alone it does not offer any more than an improved situational awareness to the 
user. In order the system to be usable it needs to operate as an aid to the decision 
maker. This is accomplished by using multiple abstraction levels maintained by 
operators and analysts, who are experts in their field. From these levels the 
created information is shared upwards and presented as a decision making view, 
also operated by a specialist. The figure 10 presents the levels from agent to 
decision making.  
 
The SACIN system does not include a component, which would be the actual 
system for effect. In the field of critical infrastructure it is not straightforward to 
create a generic gateway for effect. All the systems are different so the effect will 
most likely be gained by contacting the domain expert of the target system. This 
will force the effect system to be heterogeneous and based on multiple experts in 
their field also in the target systems.   
 
5 Conclusions and future research  
 
The technology exists for multiple challenges in the field of critical infrastructure 
situational awareness. The proposed system presents an architecture and concept 
for creating information from the society. The solutions in terms of service 
discovery, information delivery and storing are trivial from the perspective of 
technology, but the challenges lie in what is gathered and how it is gathered. At 
the same time the laws must be evaluated. What kind of information it is possible 
to collect and is it possible to demand this information from the companies and 
society based on laws? 
 
An extremely important area is the sharing. Any system in this area should not be 
planned as the endpoint of information. The best solution would be to use known 
formats for sharing the information the different actors in the field. At the same 
time the newly built system need to have gateways implemented for importing 
information. 
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Abstract  
 
Trust management has been a topic of keen interest in recent years. There has 
been a lot of discussion as to what new opportunities it can bring to concepts like 
semantic web, social networking of collaboration methods. Most of the 
researches in the field of trust management are based on assumption where trust 
is relatively static quantity between two actors. If it changes, it changes over long 
period of time. 
 
In this paper, we will discuss issues and problems to be considered when creating 
situation awareness in public authority environment. It is evident that joint 
operations between different authorities could benefit from common operative 
collaboration platform. We focus in more detail to a challenge where credibility 
of information sources might alter in very short period of time like during the 
operation. We present a formal challenge named durability of trust to address this 
event and propose methods as a solution to challenge. In addition to a challenge 
itself, methods provide new tools for improving the situation awareness. The 
discussion and views presented in this paper can be adopted in any organization 
with doubts concerning the sensitive and classified contents of current ICT 
systems in cloud computing. 
 
Keywords  
Trust management; Cloud computing; Security; Situation awareness; Public 
authority; Military 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Importance of trust management is increasing as the Internet is more open for 
access, different collaboration tools and social networking become more 
common. The relevance of trust management is gradually becoming more 
significant but the abstractive nature of the context has kept commercial 
activators and applications away. Trust management is a challenging context 
because the content varies on the frame of reference. The specific definition 
changes whether the aspect is social science, behaviour science, humanist 
108 
science, business science, political science or computer science. Within computer 
science we can focus on security, safety or integrations features and limit 
observations to computative properties. 
 
Concept of semantic web is also increasing noteworthiness. While the amount of 
sources producing data, information and knowledge is increasing and the 
possibility to identify individual actors, the question about the trustworthiness of 
source or data itself is becoming more significant. Information can be modified 
or coloured by opinions, views, interests or goals of the data producer. In 
semantic web the combination of different data fragments at best can produce 
more informative value than the arithmetic sum of the fragments. However at 
worse the information combined can be misnomer or attempt influence directly 
or indirectly to opinions or actions of recipients. 
 
Altogether trust is an emotional issue. For example a new webshop: How can 
consumers and potential clients decide whether the shop is trustworthy and not a 
hoax? Probably the enterprise name and information is viewed and the most 
advanced users will use web search for more information but in the end most 
clients just feel that everything looks fine and the need for item bypasses all 
rational considerations. For this purpose different kind of ranking by manual 
methods and automatic listings are developed in web to advice the information 
seekers. For manual decisions properties such as authority, accuracy, objectivity, 
currency and coverage are encouraged to be considered [1]. Perhaps the most 
famous webpage listing is PageRank provided by Google [2]. Rank is based on 
the amount and quality of links to page. 
 
Another kind of example on trust is a crisis area with information warfare 
produced by the both parties of the conflict. How can we determine what data is 
accurate information on the situation and what is propaganda attempting to affect 
public opinion? 
 
Public authorities in security field have sought and developed numerous means to 
improve cooperation by ICT solutions. Different kind of collaboration tools and 
environments has been deployed and integrations between systems and data 
storages have developed. It is obvious that concepts like semantic web and social 
networking gain authority cooperation. However these concepts cause also new 
challenges. Openness is can be hard to manage in highly secured environment. 
Also threat of centralizing physically or logically critical knowledge of the 
society in single location is enough to increase hostile interest on system. This 
can trigger malicious activity.  
 
In authority cooperation trust within own organization is usually unreserved. This 
trust is based on mutual experience, common procedures and professional 
community. A lot harder is to trust another authority and different organization. 
Yet on matters of professional expertise, trust is important element in operations 
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and in core specialties of the organization easy to accept in the field of public 
authorities. 
 
The main goal is to have enough sufficient information to form awareness of a 
situation. The collaboration methods improve the accuracy of the awareness and 
delegate awareness to all actors within operation. This enables better 
communications, safe procedures and more effective actions in operations 
throughout participating authority organizations. 
 
In this paper, we will discuss issues and problems to be considered when creating 
situation awareness in high security authority environment in which the need for 
computational capacity is high and the reliability of information is always 
critical. We focus in more detail to a challenge where a possibility for malicious 
intervention is present and a credibility of information sources might alter over 
time. We call the feature of maintaining trust in the aspect of situation awareness 
as a durability of trust. As a solution to problems with the durability of trust in 
high security public authority environments, we propose for methods applied 
simultaneously. These methods are propagation of trust metrics within network, 
dynamic maintenance of subjective trust map, current data flow analysis 
according to past data flow and elimination of abnormal information. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we will examine the essence of trust 
management by defining its relevant terminology, characteristics and principles, 
as well as the benefits of the technology within the scope of a public authority 
situation awareness context. Next, we address the some problems or challenges 
that exist in high security cloud collaboration platform in public authority 
context. Lastly, we focus our discussion to a trust management and propose 
possible solutions or indicate future work to be done to overcome the obstacles 
described. We will conclude with key findings and a description of the future of 
trust management in the public authority context. 
 
2 About Trust Management in Public Authority Context 
 
There has been also a lot of discussion on accurate definition of trust computing. 
The definitions presented vary more or less according to the organizational, 
business or operational environment or interests. In this paper we adopt the 
definition of trust presented by Grandison and Sloman because of the simplicity 
yet complete enough. Trust is “a quantified belief by a trustor with respect to the 
competence, honesty, security and dependability of a trustee within a specified 
context” [3]. 
 
Features of the trust management vary as the definition itself. In this paper we 
limit our observation on computative trust management. Widely accepted 
features on computative trust management include subjectivity, the expected 
probability and relevance. These features can be quantified and implemented as 
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part of a computer system. Because of subjectivity, the evaluation of trust is 
made by service requestor, client or end-user. The evaluated system or the target 
has little possibilities to affect directly to the evaluation process but indirectly it 
must present itself and its behavior as trustworthy in given context. The 
probability or the likelihood of trust indicates how strong the trust relation is. The 
probability is quantified metric of certainty of belief of the requestor and not 
absolute trustworthiness of the object. Relevance fine tunes the probability and 
limits the observation only to act or functionality essential to requestor [4]. 
 
Examining trust management characteristics in more detail can be accomplished 
by examining the trust itself. According to relevance, trust is limited to domain 
and to specific action or class of actions [4]. Trust can be seen as an aspect of 
things for specific content. Trust is rarely or never absolute. There is always 
room for interpretation or uncertainty. That is why it is usually quantified as 
probability or likelihood. The belief of trustworthiness of target does not indicate 
anything about the target itself. Target may not be competent in matter, anyway 
motivated towards the requestor or target need not to be generally reliable. 
Moreover the relation of trust is asymmetric by nature. If the requestor trusts the 
target it might not apply vice versa. We argue that the trust is rarely same with 
between two participants except if there is no trust at all to each other (i.e. 
P=zero). Even if trust is quantified as same numeric probability, the subjectivity 
prevents the realization as same kind of trust.  
 
Authorization methods and certificates identify the participants of 
communication but not symmetry of trust, because identification itself might be 
irrelevant in relation to trustworthiness of the processed content. It is also 
noteworthy that trust can be bound to role where the participant represents some 
organization while authorization always tries to identify the actor.  
 
In public authority context participants are bound to role. Participant represents 
some unit within organization. Similarly data providers such as sensors can be 
modeled by an ownership of an organizational unit. Unit has a task and a goal 
and special expertise specified by the organization. It is important to understand 
that when two actors from different units interact, one trusts the represented role 
not the actor itself. Yet the trustworthiness between two roles can be fixed on 
process level, the individual actor might have specific preferences, interests or 
experience which affects to quantitative trust.  
 
In public authority context we can set the initial credibility on process level for 
each unit according to expertise and ability to react or interpret situation around 
unit. The credibility is not static, because it changes according to situation and 
environment. Changes in goals, interests or resources differentiate credibility 
between organizations. How the credibility could be modeled between authorities 
for example in crisis situation needs more research. In this paper we limit our 
observation on analyzing the possible need for changing the trust value of given 
target. 
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3 Situation Awareness and Trust Management 
 
Improving situation awareness has become more critical in public authority 
operations and especially in military context. The possibilities and utilizations of 
situation awareness have increased together with technical evolution. Sensors 
and mobile devices increase the effectivity of collecting data from locations that 
traditionally have been difficult to access. More data can be collected and stored 
than previously which enables view on situation to be more truthful, accurate and 
comprehensive.  
 
The most severe challenges on improving situation awareness are related to 
refinement of significant information from huge amount of data, unstable data 
transfer connections and especially in field operations limited data capacities. 
Also data correctness, reliability, redundancy and timeliness have been research 
issues or discussed in several publications. Less interest has been addressed to 
trust evaluation of data based on source.  
 
This special characteristic on ensuring correctness becomes more important when 
considering a threat where some malicious actor inserts false information to 
operative decision making process. The aim of perpetrator is to have influence 
the decision itself and the environment around it. Impact to different sources of 
information will affect corresponding decision making processes. On disrupting 
single sensor, receiver of data can easily to detect failure on data feed. Detection 
is much harder if the sensor starts sending infrequently abnormal values, metrics 
or information. Yet more challenging is to detect almost correct data when 
similar results are provided from large amount of sensors. This situation can 
happen if several sensors are occupied by hostile actor. This kind of scenario 
might have very large effects. For example modification of temperature values 
from a region can have impact on decision of limiting the use of some technical 
equipment. On military operations this can give a significant advantage to 
opposite. Similarly most technical equipment is vulnerable on extreme weather 
conditions. 
 
Another example is public authority systems which use geographical positioning 
system (GPS). Modifying the GPS signal can compromise the safety of troops on 
target area. Especially on military operations this can lead to a situation where 
troops are endangered to friendly-fire. At peace time rescue service can be 
guided to a false location or police might create incorrect understanding on 
isolated area and possible fringe areas.  
 
Message or data transfer techniques are designed for ensuring the consistent data 
transfer between two nodes [5; 6]. The usual assumption is that the data itself is 
correct and the end nodes recognize each other by different authenticate methods 
such as PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) solutions [7]. Trust management brings a 
new dimension to secure data transfer by evaluating the credibility of source on 
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history information, trust or comparing the received information to constructed 
general view. 
 
4 Some challenges within Trust Management in High Security Cloud  
Environment 
 
We examine some challenges within trust management in high security cloud 
environment such as in public authority cloud. Focus is on problems which are 
derived from modern collaboration tools and situation where threat of a 
malicious actor is present. Malicious actor is motivated in preventing or 
disturbing decision making or operative ability of authorities. 
 
4.1 Semantic Web 
 
Semantic web is widely envisioned to be an extension of current web, where 
documents are annotated with meta-information. This meta-information 
describes the contents of the document on information level and enables the 
content knowledge to be processed by a machine [8]. The meta-information links 
explicitly documents with each other and improves the knowledge retrieval by 
structuring the scattered information. It is essential for semantic web to be open 
to everyone to provide knowledge and information available for every user. The 
challenge arises on the uncensored contents. The evaluation of the 
trustworthiness of knowledge and how the information can be used is on the 
consumer side. Methodologies on estimating the reliability of information source 
becomes vital [9; 10].  
 
High security public authority environment is not open environment similarly as 
Internet as whole. The user group is limited and in theory very strictly controlled. 
Public authority environment provides a trusted environment and to have an 
access to it, actor should be included in some trusted role. The strength of this 
trusted environment is that an authority can provide detailed and reliable 
information to every consumer according to special expertise. The weakness is 
that how it is controlled when authority makes a statement outside the field of 
own expertise. The status as an authority in some field does not imply the 
expertise in every field of authorities. This ends up in same situation as in open 
Internet. One might trust information that is not reliable. Actually situation in 
public authority environment is slightly more concerning because of the reliable 
nature of environment. The reliability of the information should be evaluated on 
the contents relation to information provider. As a result on this finding we argue 
that a controlled user group in trusted environment does not exclude the 
requirement of trust management for content. In addition we argue that more 
framework of the environment is specialized and more roles participate within, 
trust management role as part of content management is increased. 
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4.2 Social networking 
 
Social networking has become an effective tool for networking and maintaining 
social relations by people [11]. The private applications have also become more 
common in also business world and part of work equipment in offices equally as 
mobile phones or computers. These tools are seen also effective for information 
sharing between authorities. Especially in operative situations the need for 
common platform of information is acknowledged. If expertise of each 
participated authority is provided the value of situational awareness is 
tremendously added. Furthermore the cooperation in operative situation is 
improved and resolution for situation will be facilitated [9].  
 
The challenge is how the ownership of the combined information is determined 
and who is responsible on the interpretations of the summarized data or the faults 
that occur. Because the ownership of the data is questionable and hardly 
controlled after summarization, the requirements for good data management are 
difficult to fulfill. For example Finnish authorities have special demands for data 
management when processing sensitive data or data regulated by special 
legislation. These demands include for example traceability of operations, control 
of access, lifecycle management and quality management [12].  
 
The security classification of data is also a problem. Some authorities can have 
access to more secured or sensitive information than others. This data can be 
crucial information during some operative situation regardless of the authority in 
action. System must have proven and tested processes for management and 
accessibility of secured information generally, in operative situation and after the 
operative situation is over. 
 
4.3 Collaborative reviewing 
 
As stated in previous chapter public authorities often process very sensitive data. 
It can be that a data fragment itself by one authority is unclassified but with 
combination of different aspects on same matter by different authorities, overall 
knowledge can be security classified. Combination of several information 
sources affects to security classification of data which implies that summarized 
result should be controlled with additional security measurements. This kind of 
functionality must be implemented carefully in order to maintain the operative 
effectiveness between authorities [9].  
 
The collaboration platform with combined knowledge from different authorities 
has indisputably benefits in operative actions and decision making. The downside 
is that the centralized information also composes an alluring target for hostile 
reconnaissance operations. It must be recognized that information system 
evolved is a so-called honey pot for malicious actors and authorization methods 
and access policies should be implemented and maintained carefully [5; 6]. 
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4.4 Sensor Networks 
 
One key element composing situational awareness is to use information gathered 
from different sensors. These automatic sensors measure the environment and 
supply data from the surroundings. Sensors can be static installations or they can 
be mobile equipment transported by the units connected to the system [9; 13]. 
Devices that are used in transmitting the information on situation for requestors 
can be also the information provider. These mobile devices can produce very 
useful and by nature dynamic aspect to a situation for different kind of purposes. 
But the mobility is the risk itself because it is attached to some organizational 
unit. The information from the location of the unit is also transmitted or exposed 
with the data transferred. This might be a safety risk to unit and the personnel in 
it.  
 
Also the security classification discussed in earlier chapter might become an 
issue when collecting information and centralizing the knowledge. Sensors 
monitor conditions for operation but they also provide information on the 
surroundings of the own unit which can expose vulnerabilities on operation. Data 
provided by the sensors might be a basis for some decision which increases the 
demand of reliability of data. Security issues arises also when a sensor and its 
feed is controlled by malicious actor. 
 
4.5 Durability on Trust 
 
Situation awareness gives context to all operative decisions. Constructing 
situational awareness it is essential to rely on the information available. In public 
authority environment, also progress of time must be taken into consideration. If 
information from data source is correct and reliable today, it does not guarantee 
reliability and correctness tomorrow from same source. This applies especially in 
crisis situation where malicious actors exist and the threat of disinformation is 
present.  
 
In crisis situation the importance of credible data transfer is significantly 
increased. Maintaining reliable awareness of situation, it is important to eliminate 
all insignificant data feed relation to friendly operative actions. During the 
escalation of crisis, the construction of high security public authority cloud or 
network is dynamic and under constant change. New geographical locations 
become available or contaminated network nodes are disconnected from core 
security cloud. The possibility to evaluate realtime trustworthiness of single data 
feed is very limited. The trust properties must be adopted and referred 
accordingly the dynamic features of the environment. At the same time security 
of the sensitive data must be preserved and unachievable to outsiders [14]. 
 
Current research on trust management has mainly focused on trust between two 
actors or entities. Almost without any exception research is observed by a happy-
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day scenario where every participant is trustworthy until otherwise proven. There 
are published algorithms how to evaluate trust in each moment. However in 
dynamic environment trust is not a static feature of an entity and the durability of 
trust cannot be taken granted. In public authority environment we must ensure 
data flow correctness and create methodology to eliminate noise. In this paper we 
discuss on a situation where a trusted node forfeits credibility and how it can be 
detected. We approach the challenge by questioning the credibility of nodes at all 
times. This approach emphasizes the property of trust as non-absolute metric. We 
examine the credibility of data feed in more detail by observing delegating trust 
metrics within network, maintaining the subjective trust metrics, analyzing the 
data flow against the past data flow and eliminating the abnormal information.  
 
5 Proposed approach for durability on trust 
 
In this chapter we define the problem and propose approach for durability on 
trust. After definition we explain the approach in more detail. Let us define the 
problem as follows (see figure 1.): 
 
Asymmetric trusted relation between A and B at given time of T, does not 
guarantee trust in same relation at T+1. How the change of credibility on 
B can be detected at T+1? 
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of the problem 
 
In our approach we propose four simultaneously applied methodologies in order 
to detect the change on credibility and maintain the durability of trust in core 
system in order to improve situation awareness. This concurrency on 
methodologies ensures the reliability of our approach. If requirement for any of 
methodology is relaxed, the risk for losing situational awareness will increase.  
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Our methodologies are: 
 
 Propagation of trust metrics within network 
 Dynamic maintenance of subjective trust map 
 Current data flow analysis according to past data flow 
 Elimination of abnormal information 
 
Three first methods analyze the credibility of nodes in system. The fourth method 
analyzes the knowledge and approves that some of the data sources are not 
credible. From the situational awareness point of view, these methods cause 
single data fragments to be vanished from the entirety and their correctness to be 
neither interesting nor relevant. For strategic decision making this approach is 
more useful to build knowledge from data feeds and achieve improved situational 
awareness. It also means that the abstraction level of the trust is higher and the 
correctness of information is evaluated by the trust analysis with all actors within 
security environment. The proposed methods imply that single data fragments are 
blurred whether they are correct or not. Methods emphasize that knowledge and 
the overall awareness are more important than single data feeds or even single 
sources. On next chapters we examine methodologies in more detail. 
 
5.1 Propagation of trust metrics within network 
 
On propagation of trust metrics, each node is responsible to propagate its’ up to 
date trust metrics from neighbors to other nodes within network. Each node saves 
the information of trust metrics that it receives. This methodology enables that 
the recipient node can monitor the neighboring nodes indirectly. Indirectly means 
that the change of credibility is detected by some other node or nodes. For 
example if (B does not trust A) and (Recipient trusts B) then Recipient does not 
trust A (see figure 2.). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Evaluation credibility of source A on basis of trusted data from B 
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Propagation of trust metrics allows constructing also trust paths of information 
and more importantly isolate less credible nodes from information exchange. The 
latter feature is important especially in high security network in order to disable 
nodes that are hosted or controlled by malicious actors. 
 
Because propagation of metrics is continuous activity, it is comparable to data 
transfer metrics delegation between Internet routers. The challenge arises in this 
kind of activity, how to detect a loss of trust in single node on time. Another 
challenge in system architecture is how to deal with untrustworthy node. On 
evaluating the significance of doubt, it must be considered, should the delegation 
of trust metrics be limited or more crucially the data itself. If the data transfer to 
unreliable node remains the unchanged, it enables the transfer of disinformation 
in some cases. 
 
Naturally on this kind of evaluations there is always a possibility of misjudgment 
of credibility. The probability of misjudgment increases especially in crisis 
situation facing new and previously unknown situations. By misjudging the 
credibility, the consequences can be dramatic and the operative ability 
endangered.   
 
We propose operations and essential properties for dynamic construction of high 
security cloud environment and for detection of credibility change. 
 
One key property is a threshold of trustworthiness in environment. This fixed 
value means defines the baseline for sufficient credibility. This threshold is 
bounded to subject during evaluation. The implication is that every node has list 
of own expertise as a property list on which the trustworthiness is evaluated. For 
trust metrics outside own expertise node treats as router. This also means that the 
judgment of credibility for node is made only based on its own expertise not the 
information it transfers for other nodes. It is also essential that each node 
evaluates other nodes subjectively and according to own expertise. The 
implication is that trust metric of a node varies within network nodes. Moreover 
nodes can have several trust values for one node depending of the expertise. 
 
If node is detected untrustworthy by sufficient amount of neighboring nodes, it 
means that combination of trust metrics concerning a single node falls below a 
predefined threshold. After detection, the isolation information of this node is 
sent to all other nodes. It is essential that the decision of untrustworthiness can be 
made by any node collecting the trust metrics. This allows decentralized control 
of environment and instant responses in highly evolving situation.  
 
In dynamically constructed high security cloud environment there is two special 
cases of node operations. If a new node is attached, exist of new trusted node is 
delegated to all trusted nodes in environment. If any node is detached from 
environment, removal of node is delegated to all trusted nodes in environment. 
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The system must have also centralized administration operations in order to relax 
requirements in unexpected situation and to allow operation despite the trust 
values. These operations allow increasing or decreasing the threshold of 
trustworthiness and in extreme case the initialization or refreshing of trust 
metrics. 
 
5.2 Dynamic maintenance of subjective trust map 
 
Subjective trust map was discussed slightly in previous chapter. Here we look it 
in more detail. We discussed already in introduction chapter, that an authority 
trusts own organization without any doubt, but for other organizations only 
according to expertise. The challenge in evaluation is that how the expertise can 
be evaluated when the evaluator has not enough expertise on subject. We propose 
subjective trust map as a solution of this challenge. It allows an organization to 
evaluate credibility of information sent by other organization with help and 
confirmation of third organization which has better expertise on subject. In other 
words the reliability of feed from C can determine trustworthiness of B if B and 
C trusts each other and C is trusted [15]. 
 
Subjective trust map is based on the idea that a recipient acknowledges in what 
relation B is to A.  Relation is limited to role in context and that is why we can 
judge the trust metrics of the other nodes only by according their aspect or 
expertise. The basic principle is that the change in role or aspect might impact a 
change in subjectivity and preferences as well as ability to evaluate trust on other 
nodes. 
 
Data structure of subjective trust map is composed as a list of arrays. Each item 
in list includes a node in consumer role. It means that the item is the receiver of 
data from other nodes. The array represents key – value pairs of all possible 
sources of data. Key is the source and value is the trust value of specified subject. 
The amount of items in list is the amount of nodes in the environment. The size 
of the array exponentially enlarges by the subjects that are determined for the 
trust environment and is 2n^k, where n is the amount of sources and k the 
amount of subjects (see figure 3). Mathematically subjective trust map of a 
consumer can be represented as matrix of vectors, where size of vector is the 
trust value of source. 
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Figure 3. Illustration of subjective trust map 
 
Despite the computational requirements, it is essential that the maintenance of 
subjective trust map is continuous. This signifies that maintenance algorithms 
need more research in order to decide how the subjective trust map should be 
treated and what is relevant for each node. We find that some hierarchical 
approach in relation to neighboring nodes and organizational hierarchy (chain of 
command) should assist on computational challenge.  
 
The visualization of subjective trust map can be represented as a heat map where 
red color indicates the loss of trust in nodes. This provides a new visualized 
aspect in improving situational awareness where we can monitor our system 
environment and outsiders in it. 
 
5.3 Current data flow analysis according to past data flow 
 
Real time comparison of data flow against predicted data flow can be also 
considered as a trend analysis of data flow. The purpose is to detect 
abnormalities from data feed against assumptions on normal feed. Of course the 
normal feed from the history must be collected and stored before in order to 
detect the possible changes. Usual method on data flow analysis is to apply 
statistical trend analysis models of received data flow. The trend is formed from 
three or more known samples of historical feed and analyzing their respective 
change. This method can be used for exploring secular abnormalities. 
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Crisis escalation can be a problematic situation, because it usually is out of 
ordinary and it might differ drastically on normal situation. On that purpose 
different scenarios can be made which are simulated or known escalations of 
different crisis events. Matching the abnormality to the different scenarios this 
can be a powerful tool on detecting a crisis at early stage and provide enough 
information to effective countermeasures. 
 
As stated above, on crisis escalation this method can cause false alarm at initial 
state. However, narrowing timescale and shorten the trend observation period the 
system can produce predictions on how the situation might escalate. On the other 
hand widening the timescale and adding more samples for trend this method can 
be used in finding long term abnormalities which normally are lost in 
background noise. One example can be hostile intervention to a system and 
espionage without compromising the system directly. 
 
Naturally this kind of analysis requires significant computational capacity and 
method is most useful in cases where crisis is at early stage. After escalation of 
the crisis situation computational tasks becomes relatively expensive to this kind 
of data mining analysis, because all capacity is needed for operational use. 
One must also remember that data flow analysis prediction method is just as 
good as the model it represents. The functionality requires the baseline of 
samples from normal system activity and continuous evolvement of the baseline 
and model. Correspondingly development of different models and scenarios 
enables the improvement of situational awareness and enhance readiness for 
proactive reaction in sudden events. In military environment these scenarios and 
models are usually created and evolved in different kind of war games and 
simulations. 
 
5.4 Elimination of abnormal information 
 
When observing the situation and creating awareness from surrounding events, a 
single data fragments are not relevant. Data fragments become relevant only if 
sufficient amount of fragment represent similar phenomenon.  
 
In this method statistical average and normality is used for reducing noise from 
feed and several knowledge flows are used for correction of specific data feed on 
situational awareness level. This method can be divided to four different phases. 
In the first phase we eliminate single abnormal data fragments from dataflow. In 
this context abnormal data fragment can be a single highly deviant message from 
source or from sensor which can be assumed as a mistake or a failure. 
Mathematically it means sample which differs significantly from average. These 
deviations should be eliminated in order to release computing power to relevant 
context. The single failure of source is eliminated from our system with other 
methodologies such as subject trust map analysis. It must be also noticed that in 
very rare cases a decision can be made based on a single source of information. 
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Usually this happens only when the decision maker is the observant. Of course 
another observant might do a different decision based on same observation. This 
fact relaxes the requirement of maintaining single data fragment on construction 
of situational awareness. 
 
On the second phase it is essential to reduce the background noise from the feed. 
This can be made with filters which eliminate normal or predicted activity from 
the data feeds of the system. The samples of baseline and which were used for 
trend in previous method are useful on this noise reduction. The aim is to detect 
the information that is the most significant for the user. Naturally this means also 
that the filters for noise can vary depending of the need for information. 
 
On the third phase the data feed should be normalized. The idea is to emphasize 
the possible phenomenon with data feeds that share similar knowledge. How the 
normalization should be done in various situations need more research. 
 
In addition to these traditional method we propose a method where correctness of 
data feed is compared with data feed from another source on knowledge level. 
Two data feeds that explain same phenomenon improves the knowledge on 
situation even if the aspect of sources differs. 
 
In our proposal it is important to identify the phenomenon not the separate 
perspectives. If different actors express the same phenomenon on their own 
perspective, the reliability of the formed awareness on situation is improved. On 
the other hand, if three actors express same phenomenon and the fourth 
something divergent, the credibility of operative ability of fourth actor can be 
doubted. If this occurs in high security environment, the security of the system 
might be compromised and the reliability of the fourth actor should be analyzed. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
In this paper we examined the trust management paradigm within the public 
authority context. We stated that in operative environment the credibility of data 
source is not a static quantity. We discussed the essence in composing situation 
awareness in relation of trustworthiness of data sources. We emphasized the 
asymmetric nature of trust and found that in high security environment the trust 
is never same with two actors unless there is no trust at all. We also noted that 
more framework of the environment is specialized and more different 
participants exist, the necessity of trust management as part of content 
management is increased. 
 
122 
We identified the five obstacles in high security cloud environment and looked in 
more detail to a situation where trust between actors might change during 
operation.  Yet we noted that authorities in high security cloud benefit from 
different collaboration methods and we presented a formal challenge called a 
durability of trust and examined possible solutions to overcome credibility 
change.  
 
As a solution to maintaining the durability of trust and in order to have sufficient 
information for situation awareness, four different concurrent methods were 
proposed: Propagation of trust metrics within network, Dynamic maintenance of 
subjective trust map, Current data flow analysis according to past data flow and 
Elimination of abnormal information. With methods presented, we can monitor 
the credibility of sources in cloud environment. We also achieve improved 
situation awareness, reliable security network and new crisis escalation 
prediction tools in public authority environments. We argue that proposed 
approach enables the collection of the sufficient information in order to improve 
situational awareness based on correct data.  
 
We find trust management to be an emerging research area especially in 
networked public authority operations. Implementations of methods presented in 
this paper need more research and work to be computatively efficient in practice. 
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